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ABSTRACT

“Encouraging action during overdose events – the good, the bad, and the barriers”

by

THOMAS E. GRINER

April 17, 2019

INTRODUCTION:

Timely medical attention could decrease mortality following drug or

alcohol overdose events, but overdose victims and witnesses often delay or fail to seek
professional help because they fear police involvement. Statutes that provide immunity from
criminal action may have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment. As
overdose deaths have increased despite legislative attempts to encourage contacting authorities
during overdoses, other measures should be considered. In Georgia, recent legislation should
make opioid antagonist products like naloxone more accessible to the public.
METHODS: The first paper systematically analyzes variability in Medical Amnesty Laws (or
“Good Samaritan Laws”) across states that are designed to encourage bystanders and others to
contact authorities for assistance during overdose emergencies. The second paper examines drug
poisoning death rates in states with five years of data available after enactment of Medical
Amnesty Laws (MALs) to determine whether drug poisoning death rates have decreased. The
1

third paper utilizes a randomized survey of pharmacies across Georgia to report on barriers that
exist for the purchase of naloxone by the public.

RESULTS:

Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia have MALs, but provisions differ

widely in scope. Some laws may not meet legislative goals because they lack protections, allow
broad prosecutorial discretion, or are difficult to research, assimilate, and understand. Of the
nine states with five years’ experience with MALs, only Washington’s drug poisoning death
rates have not increased. Statistical analyses failed to find an association between MALs and
drug poisoning deaths. Among Georgia pharmacies surveyed, only half had naloxone in stock,
with prices ranging from $65.00 to $201.00. Approximately one-half of pharmacy
representatives misstated that a physician’s prescription was required to purchase naloxone,
despite a Standing Order and changes in Georgia law that removed this formerly mandated
requirement.
CONCLUSIONS:

Overdose immunity laws prove to be complex and may not be easily

understood by the general population, making them less effective in reaching statutory goals. In
Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of naloxone persist despite recent legislative changes,
making it less likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will
obtain the product. Findings from this research reveal an important opportunity to understand
how policy goals can be more strongly aligned with diverse stakeholder groups’ knowledge,
needs, and interests - from professionals to the public.
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CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs (CPDs)
and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the U.S.

Since

2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the U.S. than either motor vehicle
crashes or the misuse of firearms. (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015) Despite leading
in many areas of medical technology, the U.S. has the highest drug-related mortality rate in the
world (Cochran et al., 2014).
While street drugs posed the greatest risk of overdose for past generations, since 2002,
CPD abuse has resulted in more deaths than cocaine and heroin combined. However, increased
law enforcement pressure on the diversion of CPDs from legitimate channels has prompted drug
9

cartels to increase the supply of heroin and other illicit drugs to the American market (The U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015). Today, heroin is more readily available and drives more
overdose deaths than in 2007 (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).
Heroin carries well-known risks, and overdoses occur frequently among its users.
Research of illicit drug use conducted by Tracy and colleagues, found that approximately onehalf (50%) of respondents had a minimum of one non-fatal drug overdose event (Tracy et al.,
2005). Among intravenous drug users, those experiencing a non-fatal overdose has ranged
between 50% and 70% (Warner-Smith, Darke, Lynskey, & Hall, 2001). Moreover, those who
quit using heroin have a much higher likelihood of overdose if they renew usage, because
tolerance levels usually diminish (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010). Naloxone
(Narcan ®), the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, is easy to administer and is
commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin and other opiates
(Sporer & Kral, 2007).
Some states permit the dissemination of Naloxone to drug users’ family members,
friends, and others who may be in the best position to respond directly to witnessed overdose
events (Davis & Carr, 2015; Galea et al., 2006; Phillips, 2013; Seal et al., 2003; Sporer & Kral,
2007). While effective in many cases, this approach is not without potential problems. Because
10

Naloxone is generally safe and effective against opioid based overdoses, some may rely too
much on its ameliorating effects and fail to seek professional help following an overdose.
Further, Naloxone is only effective with opioid-based overdoses. Overreliance on Naloxone or
simply not knowing what drugs are taken by a victim could prove disastrous with a poly-drug
overdose or when the overdose agent is not an opioid, because Naloxone does not ameliorate the
effects of non-opioid drugs or alcohol. Naloxone may also be perceived as a “safety net” which
enables opioid drug users to take risks with dosage levels.
Like many states Georgia’s drug overdose death rates have risen each year. From 2010
to 2017, Georgia’s overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while the population
increased 7.6%. i The characteristics of Georgia’s drug overdose deaths have also changed. The
percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths increased from 40.1% in
2010 to 64.4% in 2017 (see Appendix Table 1). Drug poisoning deaths are also distributed
unevenly across Georgia: out of 159 counties, 42 reported higher poisoning death rates than the
national average during 2008 - 2014. Georgia’s most populous 20 counties account for more
than 50% of all statewide drug poisoning deaths.
Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first responders to carry and
administer Naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise occur while
transporting an overdose victim to a hospital. While published research has demonstrated the
effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green, Beletsky, Schoeppe, Coffin, & Kuszler, 2013),
other studies show that emergency medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of
11

overdose events (Seal et al., 2003; Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001). The low rate of
EMS activation occurs in part because witnesses to overdose are often drug abusers themselves,
and fear legal consequences such as arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of
probation or bond conditions, or violations of Temporary Protective Orders (Banta-Green et al.,
2013; Darke & Zador, 1996; Davidson et al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin, Davey, &
Latkin, 2005).
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained
personnel could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States. Many states have enacted
statutes that provide immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or
both. Often called “Good Samaritan Laws” or “Medical Amnesty Laws” (MALs), these statutes
are meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall
goal of saving lives.
“Good Samaritan Law” versus “Medical Amnesty Law”
Throughout this dissertation, the term “Medical Amnesty Law” (MAL) is used
universally to categorize statutes that grant full or partial immunity from criminal liability
specifically following overdose events. In contrast, the term “Good Samaritan law” (GSL) has
traditionally described statutes that provide protection from civil liability based on negligence
committed during good-faith attempts to assist during an emergency (Dov Waisman, 2013). For
clarity, therefore, this paper distinguishes statutes that provide protection from civil liability
following an wide spectrum of accidents (“Good Samaritan laws”) from statutes that provide
12

immunity from criminal responsibility specifically following overdose events (“Medical
Amnesty Laws”), irrespective of how a statute may be labeled.
Summary of limitations in literature
Two surveys support the notion that target populations are largely ignorant of the
existence of MALs or their provisions. One survey among Washington police officers and
paramedics by Banta-Green and colleagues conducted in the Fall of 2011 found that few had
knowledge of the state’s MAL, which had been passed in June of 2010 (Banta-Green et al.,
2013). Although the majority of respondents had been present at an overdose during the prior
year, only 16% of the officers and 7% of the paramedics surveyed were aware of the new law.
Knowledge increased following an informational intervention.
A second survey by Evans (Evans, Hadland, Clark, Green, & Marshall, 2016) among
young adult users of non-prescription opioids found that fewer than half (45.5%) were aware of
Rhode Island’s MAL. Participants were recruited from January 2015 through February 2016 and
were surveyed about, among other things, knowledge of the 2012 MAL. Awareness of Rhode
Island’s MAL was associated with older age (age range was 18 to 29), being white, a history of
incarceration, a history of injection drug use, lifetime heroin use, witnessing or experiencing an
overdose, having heard of naloxone, knowing where to obtain naloxone, and experience
administering naloxone (all p < 0.05). The final explanatory regression model found an
independent association between awareness of Rhode Island’s MAL and lifetime injection drug
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use, having heard of naloxone, and knowing where to obtain naloxone. An informational
intervention was recommended.
Two studies have attempted to determine whether MALs have actually been effective in
accomplishing the goal of reducing overdose deaths by encouraging calls for professional
assistance. Rees attempted to measure the effects of naloxone access laws (NALs) and “Good
Samaritan Laws” on opioid-related deaths. (Rees, Sabia, Argys, Latshaw, & Dave, 2017)
Drawing upon mortality data obtained from the National Vital Statistics System multiple causeof-death mortality files for the period 1999 – 2014, those researchers found evidence that
adoption of a NAL leads to a reduction in opioid-related deaths of 9 to 11 percent, but failed to
find statistically significant effects of MALs at conventional levels.
McClennan used 2000 – 2014 National Vital Statistics System data, 2002 – 2014
National Survey on Drug Use and Health data, and primary datasets of the location and timing of
NALs and “Good Samaritan Laws” nationwide and reported that states with a MAL had a 15%
(p = 0.050) lower incidence of opioid-overdose mortality (McClellan et al., 2018). However, use
of this timeframe limits the amount of data available to follow any trend in mortality, since seven
(7) states enacted a MAL in 2014, six (6) states enacted a MAL in 2013, and five (5) states
enacted a MAL in 2012. Only four (4) states would present 4 or more years of data following
enactment of a MAL.

14

Statement of Purpose
The three studies presented in this dissertation address different, but interconnected,
facets of combating the current overdose crisis. The first study surveys MALs nationwide in an
effort to provide baseline data on what protections currently exist. This contributes to a growing
knowledge of MALs by analyzing statutory features that bear on the applicability of MALs to a
broad range of overdose scenarios and whether or not MALs are easily understood. Further, this
work reviews features that may make some MALs more effective than others in encouraging
calls for professional assistance following overdose events. Suggestions are made concerning
the language most likely to encourage calls for professional assistance during overdose events.
The second paper presented in this dissertation attempts to add to growing knowledge of
the efficacy of MALs by comparing drug poisoning death data from the five year periods before
and after enactment of a MAL in those nine (9) states with the longest history of MALs. While
Rees (2017) and McClellan (2018) studied the effects of MALs on opioid-overdose mortality,
this dissertation presents a broader analysis by studying the effects of MALs on drug poisoning
deaths generally.
From 2010 to 2017, the percentage of opioid-related overdose deaths among drug
poisoning deaths in Georgia increased from approximately 40% to nearly 65%. Failing to
address the increasing importance of the opioid class of drugs would omit an important piece in
15

drug poisoning deaths in Georgia. The third study examines barriers that may make purchasing
Narcan®, an intra-nasally administered form of naloxone, more difficult in Georgia. An
examination of price, availability, and pharmacy policies that may discourage the discrete
purchase of Narcan® may illustrate barriers not addressed by legislation. To date, no other such
study has been conducted.

16

CHAPTER 2 – NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF MEDICAL
AMNESTY LAWS

Abstract
TITLE: “State-by-State Examination of Overdose Medical Amnesty Laws.”
INTRODUCTION:

Timely medical attention could decrease mortality following drug or

alcohol overdose events, but overdose victims and witnesses alike often delay or fail to seek
professional help because they fear police involvement. Statutes that provide immunity from
criminal action can have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment.
METHODS: We systematically collected and reviewed Medical Amnesty Laws (commonly
know as “Good Samaritan Laws”) that are designed to encourage bystanders and others to
contact authorities for assistance during overdose emergencies. Each law was coded to analyze:
(1) who receives statutory protections and under what circumstances; (2) what factors may
undercut the credibility of statutory protections for those who may already distrust authorities;
and (3) whether statutory language is easily attainable and understandable.
RESULTS:

Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia have Medical Amnesty Laws

(MALs), but provisions differ widely in their scope of protection. Some laws may not meet
legislative goals because they either lack protections against collateral consequences of reporting
an overdose or allow broad prosecutorial discretion. Most MALs refer to other statutes for
definitions, making them harder to research, assimilate, and understand.
17

CONCLUSIONS:

Some statutory provisions should be more effective than others in

encouraging calls for professional assistance following overdose events. Narrow immunity
provisions with complex language may not be easily understood by the general population,
making certain statutes less effective in reaching statutory goals. Prosecuting attorneys and
policymakers are wise to consider overarching policy goals and potentially unintended
consequences when considering prosecution and future legislation.

Background
Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs
(“CPDs”) and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the U.S.
Since 2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the U.S. than either motor
vehicle crashes or the misuse of firearms (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010). Naloxone
products such as Narcan®, the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, are easy to
administer and are commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin
18

and other opiates (Sporer & Kral, 2007). Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first
responders to carry and administer naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise
occur while transporting an overdose victim to a hospital. While published research has
demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green et al., 2013), other studies show
that emergency medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of overdose events (Seal
et al., 2003; Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001). The low rate of EMS activation occurs in
part because witnesses to overdoses are often drug abusers themselves and fear legal
consequences such as arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of probation or bond
conditions, or violations of temporary protective orders (Banta-Green et al., 2013; Darke &
Zador, 1996; Davidson et al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin et al., 2005; Tracy et al., 2005).
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained
personnel is a legislative goal that could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States. In
West Virginia, for example, “The Legislature finds it is in the public interest to encourage
citizens to intervene in drug and alcohol overdose situations by seeking potentially life-saving
emergency medical assistance for others without fear of being subject to certain criminal
penalties.” West Virginia 16-47-2 (b). Nearly all states have enacted statutes that provide
immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or both. Often called
“Medical Amnesty Laws”, “Medical Immunity Laws”, or “Good Samaritan Laws”, these statutes
are meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall
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goal of saving lives. 1 To be an effective medical amnesty law, a statute must grant immunity in
a broad range of overdose events, convince those affected that its statutory protections will be
followed by law enforcement officials, and be readily understood by those seeking to understand
its legislative provisions.
Methodology
This study identifies provisions in state statutes that are most likely to save lives by
encouraging overdose victims and witnesses to seek professional help during overdose events
involving any substance. “Naloxone access” laws, which provide civil or criminal protections
for those who administer naloxone (an “opioid antagonist”) to opioid overdose victims, are
excluded as being too limited in scope to motivate behavior during a wide spectrum of overdose
events. Similarly, “mitigation only” statutes, which do not confer immunity at all but merely
grant an ability to argue for leniency at a sentencing hearing, are not included because they are
unlikely to encourage those who distrust authorities to take action.

In this paper, the term “Medical Amnesty Law” is used universally to categorize statutes
that grant full or partial immunity from criminal liability specifically following overdose events.
In contrast, the term “Good Samaritan” law has traditionally described statutes that provide
protection from civil liability based on negligence committed during good-faith attempts to assist
during an emergency. (Dov Waisman, 2013) For clarity, therefore, this paper distinguishes
statutes that provide protection from civil liability following an wide spectrum of accidents
(“Good Samaritan” laws) from statutes that provide immunity from criminal responsibility
specifically following overdose events (“Medical Amnesty” laws), irrespective of how a statute
may be labeled.
1
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Using standard legal research procedures, a research team reviewed statutes that provide
immunity in overdose emergencies. The legal research system Fastcase was used to search for
statutes in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands that grant
immunity for any reason in overdose emergencies.2 Multiple searches generated lists of statutes
for review. These results were then cross-referenced with a publicly available resource located
at https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/qz5pvn/legal-interventions-to-reduce-overdose.pdf
(Davis & Carr, 2015) to ascertain whether all potentially useful statutes had been collected. The
research team then determined whether the language of each statute provided immunity from
criminal justice actions such as arrest or prosecution within the context of a drug or alcohol
overdose. This research includes all laws in effect as of January, 2019.
Characteristics of each statute were then evaluated under the following criteria:
1. Coverage - The strength of a medical amnesty law’s ability to encourage bystanders
and/or victims of overdose to contact authorities hinges on its ability to provide
protections in a broad range of overdose events. (Table 1, Items 3 – 4)
2. Credibility - An effective medical amnesty law must be convincing to those affected that
statutory protections will be followed by law enforcement officials. (Table 1, Items 5 16)
2

Fastcase is a popular online legal research system that provides free access to members of many Bar Associations
nationwide, including the State Bars of Arizona, Arkansas, Washington D.C., Delaware, Federal Circuit Bar
Association, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. https://www.fastcase.com/barassociations/ accessed 12/26/18.
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3. Accessibility - An effective medical amnesty law must be understandable and
ascertainable by the intended readership. (Table 1, Items 17 - 19)

Results
One potentially effective way to address overdose deaths is to remove disincentives for
contacting authorities when overdose events occur. MALs have been enacted by statute in the
majority of states and generally seek to increase the number of requests for professional
assistance during overdose emergencies by removing threats associated with the criminal justice
system. This study comprehensively describes aspects of medical amnesty laws most likely to
accomplish the intended policy goals of saving lives by encouraging requests for professional
assistance during overdose events.
Forty-seven states (including the District of Columbia, hereinafter included as a “state”)
have enacted statutes, or contain provisions in existing statutes, that provide some measure of
immunity against criminal prosecution following drug or alcohol overdose events. Some states
(Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and
North Carolina) have more than one MAL that provides for immunity under different
circumstances. Indiana only has a “mitigation only” statute. Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming
do not have MALs as defined in this work. Composite overviews are presented in Table 2 and
Table 3.
22

1. Coverage. (See Table 2) Medical amnesty laws across the U.S. do not provide
immunity consistently for everyone associated with an overdose event.
A primary concern involves exactly who receives immunity from criminal charges, such
as the illegal possession of controlled substances or underage possession of alcohol, following an
overdose event. If immunity provisions cover only those who seek aid on behalf of an overdose
victim, some may hesitate or fail to contact authorities out of concern that the overdose victim
may later face criminal charges. Conversely, if a statute provides immunity for the overdose
victim only, bystanders may fear contacting authorities for their own sake. What about a
bystander who attempts first aid on the victim, or lends a cell phone to another who calls for
assistance? Clear statutory definitions and broader coverage of those who may assist during an
overdose emergency will more likely encourage timely contact of authorities.
Amid the current, widely reported opioid overdose crisis, alcohol and non-opioid drug
overdoses seem all but forgotten. Medical amnesty laws that provide immunity for a broad range
of overdose scenarios are more likely to encourage timely contact of authorities than statutes that
limit immunity to a narrower range.
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Seeker of aid only
This study identified seven statutes (from Alabama, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) that allow immunity for the seeker of aid only, providing no
immunity for the overdose victim. This lack of immunity for the victim may discourage
overdose bystanders from contacting authorities, especially if the overdose victim is a friend or
loved one.
Other statutory language may also dissuade bystanders from contacting authorities. In
Iowa and Minnesota, the seeker of aid must be the first one to contact authorities to receive
immunity. In South Carolina, a caller for help must reasonably believe that he or she is the first
one to call to receive immunity. Provisions such as these are less likely to encourage those who
witness an overdose to contact authorities than statutes with more permissive language.
Seeker of aid and others
While it may be clear that someone seeks medical assistance when they call 9-1-1 for
emergency assistance or deliver an overdose victim to a hospital, some states clearly extend
immunity to those who assist in other ways. Kentucky, for example, provides immunity for
those who “act in concert” with a caller during an overdose. Hawaii defines "seeking medical
assistance" as action that “includes but is not limited to reporting a drug or alcohol overdose to
law enforcement, the 9-1-1 system, a poison control center, or a medical provider; assisting
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someone so reporting; or providing care to someone who is experiencing a drug or alcohol
overdose while awaiting the arrival of medical assistance.” §329-43.6 (a) (2).
Including all who attempt to help during an emergency is important, as an individual who
renders first aid to an overdose victim (while another calls 9-1-1) may help save the victim’s life.
An individual who meets first responders at the curb and leads them to an overdose victim may
save precious minutes that prove critical. Contributing to a life-saving effort beyond placing a 91-1 call should not be disregarded or ignored, as mightoccur in those states that do not clearly
provide for immunity for all individuals who aid or assist in overdose emergencies. Failing to
grant immunity to all who provide meaningful assistance seems to undercut the often-stated
legislative purpose of saving lives.
Although opponents to more inclusive measures may argue that the drug-using
population could flout the law by falsely claiming that they assisted in order to obtain immunity,
provisions such as the “good faith” requirement contained in most statutes already address this
concern (See Table 1, Item 16).
The overdose victim
Many states confer immunity on the overdose victim whether a third party calls on the
victim’s behalf or whether the victim contacts authorities on his or her own. Missouri’s medical
amnesty law is exemplary:
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A person who, in good faith, seeks or obtains medical assistance for someone who is
experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose or other medical emergency or a person
experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose or other medical emergency who seeks medical
assistance for himself or herself or is the subject of a good faith request. MO Rev. Stat
195.205 1. 2.
However, other states are far less lenient on overdose victims. Colorado, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania mandate that overdose victims qualify for immunity only if the caller for
assistance qualifies. Alaska, Arkansas, and Virginia extend immunity to overdose victims only if
they seek medical assistance themselves. Maryland requires that the overdose victim reasonably
communicates that a medical emergency is occurring in order to receive immunity.
Requiring an overdose victim to participate in the request for assistance seems to ignore
the most serious overdose scenario: when the overdose victim loses consciousness and is unable
to ask for help. For example, a person who loses consciousness will be unable to reasonably
communicate that a medical emergency is occurring to receive immunity in Maryland, or meet
Alaska’s requirement that he or she “was experiencing a drug overdose and sought medical
assistance” Alaska 11.71.311 (a) (2), or meet the requirement in Arkansas that the victim “… in
good faith seek[s] medical assistance for himself or herself.” Arkansas 20-13-1704 (a) (2).
A person may only qualify for immunity one time
A few states limit the number of times a person qualifies for immunity under a medical
amnesty law. Under 34-20A-113, for example, South Dakota provides: “Any person seeking
medical assistance or who reports a person is in need of medical assistance shall only qualify
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once for immunity under §§ 34-20A-109 to 34-20A-112, inclusive.” Iowa also permits an
individual to receive immunity only one time. Tennessee only confers immunity for an overdose
victim on his or her first overdose. South Carolina seems to allow some discretion with the court
concerning whether immunity may be permitted for seeking aid more than once:
“If the person seeking medical assistance pursuant to this section previously has sought
medical assistance for another person pursuant to this article, the court may consider the
circumstances of the prior incidents and the related offenses to determine whether to
grant the person immunity from prosecution.” SC Code 44-53-1920 (C)

What substance involved in overdose event qualifies
States also vary in what type of overdose event is covered: some states provide immunity
for alcohol-only overdoses, other states provide immunity for only drug overdoses, and still other
states allow immunity for either drug or alcohol overdoses. Twenty-two states have statutes that
provide for immunity only when an overdose involves a controlled substance, or other drug, and
completely exclude alcohol overdoses. Texas and Maine permit immunity only in alcohol
overdose cases, with no provisions for drug overdoses. Twenty-three states specifically allow
immunity for either drug or alcohol-related overdose events. Many states define “drug”
overdoses as those involving controlled substances, while a few include alcohol in the definition
of a “drug”. Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon have statutes that limit immunity to
overdoses involving only certain drugs, such as methamphetamine or marijuana. The extent to
which states fail to provide adequate definitions for “overdose” is further examined in Part 3.
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Statutory language that imposes more restrictive provisions will apply to fewer overdose
events and will be less likely to encourage bystanders and others to contact authorities during
overdose events. Statutes that are less encouraging are less likely to achieve the desired
legislative goal of saving lives.
2. Credibility. (See Tables 2 and 3) Medical amnesty laws across the U.S. do not provide
consistent assurances that statutory protections will be followed.
A MAL is unlikely to influence action during an overdose event unless those affected
believe that immunities described will actually be granted by authorities. A prosecuting
attorney’s ability to exercise discretion or find exceptions to a statute that allow prosecution
despite an initial appearance of immunity may undercut public trust. Such discretion may be
used in a manner that systematically excludes certain members of the public from receiving the
benefits of a MAL, such as addicts with a history of drug-related arrests. MALs were evaluated
to determine whether they imposed certain requirements for an individual to qualify for
immunity, whether immunity is disallowed in absence of good faith, whether the overdose event
may be considered as a mitigating circumstance if full immunity is not granted, whether
immunity requires evidence from the overdose event, and whether immunity may apply to
crimes involving the distribution of drugs or alcohol.
Similarly, an official’s ability to seek penalties outside of prosecution may foster enmity
among those who already distrust authorities. Because many drug users fear police involvement,
these collateral consequences, or potentially unforeseen penalties, of reporting an overdose are
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critical to consider. Collateral consequences may include civil asset forfeiture, using evidence
gathered during an overdose event to prosecute other crimes, levying sanctions or requiring drug
testing for those already under court supervision, or prosecution for possession of drug
paraphernalia.
Civil asset forfeiture (See Table 2)
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings vary from state to state, but generally allow authorities
to gain legal possession and title to assets, property, money, and other items that are “fruits of a
crime”. In some instances, seizure of assets may exact the most immediate, painful cost on a
suspect because such assets could otherwise be used to hire legal counsel, post bond, or pay bills.
Only Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, and Vermont provide some measure
of protection from civil asset forfeiture proceedings within medical amnesty statutes. Because
government officials could potentially confiscate and gain ownership of property (including
money) following overdose events in other states, public confidence in those medical amnesty
laws may erode, especially among the drug-using population. Further, not allowing some
protection from civil asset forfeiture proceedings may outright discourage more wealthy
individuals from contacting authorities during overdose events.
Probation/parole/pretrial release (See Table 2)
Unless an amnesty statute provides special protections for those on probation, pretrial
release, or parole, individuals in that position are less likely to contact authorities for assistance
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during an overdose event. Probationers and parolees are important consider because they are
often at greater risk of overdose than others. Noble v. State, Case No. 2476 (Md. App., 2018).
Twenty-one states limit the ability to drug test or otherwise sanction a person on probation,
pretrial release, or parole following a drug overdose event. The lack of protection in remaining
states makes those under court supervision less likely to contact authorities.
Those under court supervision may still have to defend their actions following an
overdose event, even in states that provide some measure of protection under a medical amnesty
law. See Noble v. Maryland, Case No. 2476 (Md. App., 2018). In North Carolina, a person on
probation receives immunity for certain criminal charges, but still may be drug tested; the upshot
of which may result in a revocation of probation and a jail sentence if such drug test is positive.
Because those on probation, parole, or pretrial release are particularly vulnerable to law
enforcement action, a lack of protections in this area will more likely provide a disincentive to
contact authorities during drug overdose events.

Drug paraphernalia (See Table 2)
Thirty states provide immunity for charges pertaining to the possession or use of drug
paraphernalia during an overdose event. Remaining states either specifically allow prosecution
or are silent on this issue, seemingly leaving drug paraphernalia charges available for
prosecution. Although drug paraphernalia charges are usually considered minor offenses, the
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presence of such items can justify a police search of property, support the decision to arrest, or
be used to lengthen a criminal sentence. The extent to which individuals contact authorities for
assistance during overdose events, and later face legal consequences that arise from that contact,
however remote, may influence future requests for professional assistance.
Limitations on protections – prosecutorial discretion (See Table 3)
Some states allow prosecuting attorneys discretion in determining whether or not
immunity applies in a given case. While officials should be able to exercise reasonable
discretion in pursuing criminal charges, the public should not believe that the process is too
subjective. A prosecuting attorney’s ability to exercise discretion or find exceptions in a given
case that enable either prosecution or aggravation of punishment despite an initial appearance of
immunity should be cautiously measured so as to not undercut public trust.
Medical amnesty laws often allow subjectivity to enter prosecutorial decision making by
specifying requirements that an individual must meet to qualify for immunity, by requiring that a
person act in good faith, or by allowing the use of evidence gathered during an overdose event to
prosecute other crimes. Prosecutors may be more limited by medical amnesty laws that permit
an overdose event to be considered as a mitigating circumstance if full immunity is not granted
or that require that evidence of a crime originate from the overdose event. Prosecutors may also
be limited by medical amnesty laws that permit immunity for crimes involving the distribution of
drugs or alcohol.
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Specific requirements to receive immunity (See Table 3)
More than half of the states with a medical amnesty law describe requirements that an
individual must meet in order to receive immunity, such as providing a name, remaining with the
overdose victim, or cooperating with officials. Such requirements may allow prosecutorial
discretion regarding who receives immunity. For instance, someone who calls 9-1-1 to report an
overdose but fails to provide his or her full name, or fails to “cooperate” with police by providing
names of all attendees at a party may or may not be considered to have met statutory
requirements. California, for example, requires that a person “not obstruct” a law enforcement
officer, which may be subjectively applied under the facts of a given case.
These provisions help ensure that police and first responders receive complete
information about an overdose event. While legislators may trust police officers and prosecuting
attorneys to make appropriate decisions in such matters, the drug-using population (and their
friends) may not share the same enthusiasm. Witnesses to overdose may be reluctant to provide
a complete name, or wish to make a statement regarding drug use by the overdose victim or
others. Such hesitation to fully cooperate may be deemed a failure to meet the standards of a
medical amnesty law. Statutes with fewer requirements to receive immunity may garner more
calls for authority in overdose emergencies than those with cumbersome requirements.
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Requirement of good faith
Oregon, Nebraska, Texas, and Wisconsin do not require that a person act in “good faith”
in seeking assistance either for him or herself or a third party, or have a “reasonable belief” that a
person needs medical assistance. Medical amnesty laws in all other states contain these “good
faith” and “reasonable belief” requirements, which have their own merit in preventing
individuals from defrauding the criminal justice system. However, these provisions also could
provide prosecutors with the ability to negate well-intentioned actions in some cases by deeming
an action to be “not in good faith” and pursuing criminal charges.
Partial immunity where full immunity not granted (See Table 3)
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont and West Virginia have statutes that allow the accused to mitigate a sentence by
arguing for partial immunity where the accused does not qualify for full immunity.
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Dakota
have similar provisions for drug offenses, but not alcohol-related offenses. However, at a
sentencing hearing where full immunity is not granted, argument for leniency on the behalf of
the accused enables the prosecuting attorney to request harsher sentencing by pointing out
aggravating factors.
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Evidence obtained as result of overdose event (See Table 3)
As officials enter the scene of an overdose event they may observe incriminating
evidence, and to the extent that they can then bring criminal charges, confidence in medical
amnesty laws may decrease. Most states provide that immunity provisions protect against
prosecution where evidence is discovered as a result of the overdose event and the need for
medical assistance. However, such provisions generally allow police to secure evidence by other
means, such as receiving consent from a property owner to conduct a thorough search for
contraband or by obtaining a search warrant to conduct a search. California, Delaware, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not articulate that immunity applies only where evidence is
obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance. Nebraska and Louisiana
require evidence from the overdose event for immunity in drug overdose cases, but not alcohol
overdose cases.
Requiring evidence from the overdose event for immunity means that criminal
investigations that were undertaken prior to an overdose event could remain viable. However,
the boundaries of police investigations are often blurry, leaving prosecutors able to pursue
charges in some situations despite well-meaning intentions of an overdose witness.
Evidence gathered independently of overdose event
All states with medical amnesty laws allow the use of evidence gathered independently
from the overdose event to prosecute other crimes. This means that officers who are alerted to
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the scene of an overdose may conduct surveillance and make valid arrests based on crimes they
later witness. Likewise, officers who arrive at the scene of an overdose may obtain consent to
search property such as a car, book bag, or residence, and may seek charges for contraband
discovered.
While some may be less likely to contact authorities during overdose events because of
the possibility of being charged with other crimes, an appropriate balance should exist between
promoting responsible behavior during overdose events and allowing police to enforce criminal
laws. Allowing evidence gathered independently from an overdose event enables criminal
investigations that began before the overdose event to remain intact, and also permits law
enforcement personnel to pursue other criminal charges unrelated to the overdose event itself.
Application to distribution crimes (See Table 3)
Most states grant immunity only for “simple” possession charges of illegal drugs or
possession of alcohol by minors, as opposed to charges involving the distribution of alcohol or
drugs. Prosecutors may be allowed to bootstrap other evidence, such as the presence of cash,
weighing scales, or text messages to support prosecution of drug or alcohol distribution charges,
which would remove such charges from the purview of medical amnesty laws.
While all entities that provide immunity for drug crimes include “simple” possession of
certain amounts of a drug among covered offenses, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee additionally cover specified crimes related to the
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distribution, exchange, or delivery of certain drugs. The District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont provide some form of immunity for crimes other
than “simple” possession of alcohol by minors, such as purchasing, acquiring, or sharing alcohol
with a minor. Expanding amnesty beyond possession of small amounts of drugs may reach
those segments of the drug using population who possess the most drugs, and therefore may be
most at risk of overdose. Conversely, those heavily involved in the drug or (illegal) alcohol
distribution business should not be granted unbridled immunity.
3. Accessibility. (See Table 3) Medical amnesty laws across the United States are not
consistently drafted in a manner that is easily researched or understood by the public.
To effectively encourage those present at overdose events to contact authorities, statutory
language should be easy to research and understand. This group of statutory characteristics
concerns the ease with which each statute can be interpreted: whether a definition is provided for
“overdose”, and whether references are made to other statutes for definitions or other purposes.
A statute is unlikely to be effective unless its intended audience can understand its
provisions. Beyond having clear language, the provisions of an effective medical amnesty law
should be researchable with a reasonable amount of effort. The efficacy of each medical
amnesty law was measured by whether a definition for “overdose” was provided and how many
other statutes were referenced (See Table 1, Items 17 – 19).
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Definition of “overdose” (See Table 3)
Whether an event constitutes an “overdose” may be obvious in many cases, but unclear in
others. Consider a social event where a person is lethargic and unresponsive. Others attempt to
offer aid. Believing this to be an overdose, well-meaning bystanders contact authorities, who
arrive and begin treating the patient. Police also arrive and notice alcohol or drugs present. A
medical examination determines that the person was not suffering an overdose at all, but rather,
suffered from a medical condition that might appear to be an overdose. Could those at the party
be charged with crimes related to the illegal possession of drugs or, in the case of minors, the
illegal possession of alcohol? If so, reports of such treatment by authorities may discourage
those who encounter lethargic individuals from contacting authorities.
Certain medical conditions may carry symptoms that mimic intoxication or overdose. A
person’s true level of intoxication may also change. Providing a definition of “overdose” is
therefore important to avoid uncertainty. Most states provide a definition for “overdose” or
medical emergency, which can be helpful in determining whether a reported overdose event
should qualify for immunity, and may thus save the expense of litigation. For example, the
Florida medical amnesty statute does not contain a definition of “overdose”, which became a
litigated issue in a criminal case (Florida v. Silliman, Case Number 5D14-2895, Fla. App.,
2015). See also State v. Brooks, 210 So.3d 514 (La.App., 2016), in which the Court of Appeals
of Louisiana reversed the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to quash the bill of
information. In Brooks, officers responded to a scene regarding two males who were “using
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drugs” or “passed out high on drugs”. An officer located two males in a car who appeared to be
unconscious. After failing to get a response from the males, the officer opened the driver’s door
and both males awoke. The males complied with the officer’s commands, did not lose
consciousness or “slobber” again, and refused medical assistance. The relevant statute, La. R.S.
14:403.10, lacks a definition of “overdose”. The court reasoned that for the purposes of La. R.S.
14:403.10 B (the relevant MAL ) an overdose “must be of a lethal, toxic, or poisonous amount
that is capable of causing death or serious injury, rather than one which is merely dangerous, ‘too
great a dose,’ or causing a lower level of consciousness.” Otherwise, the court reasoned, “[A]ny
amount of a [Controlled Dangerous Substance] [would] satisfy this prong of the test for
immunity granted by La. R.S. 14:403.10 B.” (210 So. at 520) See also State v. Jago, 209 So.3d
1078 (La. App., 2016) which involved the co-defendant.
If the legislative goal is truly to save lives by encouraging more calls for professional
assistance during overdose events, medical amnesty laws should include a definition of overdose
to eliminate guesswork and interpretation by courts. Better yet, medical amnesty laws could
encompass definitions such as those found in Georgia and Mississippi, which contemplate a
layperson’s subjective belief of whether a person is experiencing an overdose.
In Georgia:
"Drug overdose" means an acute condition, including, but not limited to, extreme
physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma,
mania, or death, resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance
or dangerous drug by the distressed individual in violation of this chapter or that a
reasonable person would believe to be resulting from the consumption or use of a
38

controlled substance or dangerous drug by the distressed individual. O.C.G.A. §
16-13-5(a) (1).

Georgia’s alcohol-related medical amnesty law defines overdose as follows:
"Alcohol related overdose" means an acute condition, including, but not limited
to, extreme physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory
depression, coma, mania, or death, resulting from the consumption or use of
alcohol or that a layperson would reasonably believe to be resulting from the
consumption or use of alcohol for which medical assistance is required. O.C.G.A.
§ 3-3-23 (j) (1) (A).
To encourage professional calls for assistance during overdose events, some leeway
should exist that enables bystanders and overdose victims to contact authorities without having
to accurately diagnose an overdose victim’s true medical condition.
The presence or absence of a definition of overdose may serve another benefit relating to
the credibility that authorities will acknowledge immunities named in medical amnesty laws.
For instance, in both Silliman supra, and Brooks, supra, courts grappled with medical amnesty
laws that lack a definition for overdose. Both courts looked to other sources and denied
immunity because intoxication levels failed to be sufficiently serious. Leaving such matters to
court interpretation is less certain and unclear than defining what constitutes an overdose for the
purposes of a statute. Further, providing a definition of “overdose” may assist public health
officials distribute accurate information about medical amnesty laws to the public.
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References to other statutes (See Table 3)
When a statute refers to other statutes for definitions, the legal research process becomes
more complicated and less likely to be completed comprehensively (Read, 1941). Courts often
interpret a law in an unexpected way, or declare it altogether invalid, when a statute refers to
other statutes for definitions (Boyd, 2008).
Nearly all medical amnesty laws refer to other statutes for definitions or other purposes.
Only medical amnesty statutes from Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Rhode Island, and South Dakota,
and one of two statutes from Kentucky make no such references to other laws. Medical amnesty
statutes from Alabama, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Texas, and one each from
Nebraska and North Carolina make only one reference to another statute for defining terms.
Twenty-six states have at least one medical amnesty law that refers to four or more other statutes
for defining characteristics or other information. Delaware, the District of Columbia, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia have medical amnesty
laws that refer to seven or more statutes.
While references to multiple statutes undoubtedly complicate legal research, failing to
provide citations may complicate research even more. For example, understanding one
Connecticut statute (21a-279) may require the reader to look up what is a “controlled substance”
in that state, without a citation to the relevant statute. Illinois omits a citation for “Class 3 felony
possession of methamphetamine” in one of its medical amnesty laws (720 ILCS 646/115),
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leaving the reader to research what constitutes that offense. Such complexity decreases the
likelihood that a reader will fully research or understand the provisions of a statute.
Limitations and Future Research
State legislatures may enact medical amnesty laws and appellate courts may interpret
statutes in a manner unforeseen by the authors. As of this writing, most states do not have a
lengthy history with their respective medical amnesty laws. This work should be viewed as a
starting point and future research should seek the most effective language in prompting calls for
professional assistance during overdose events.
Conclusion
Medical amnesty laws have been enacted in a majority of states and in the District of
Columbia to encourage requests for professional assistance during overdose emergencies by
alleviating the fear of criminal charges. Laws vary drastically, and some statutes may be more
effective than others in encouraging calls for professional assistance.
This study defined major features of existing medical amnesty laws as a first step in
determining what provisions are most effective. By comparing the efficacy of different medical
amnesty laws, policy makers can craft effective tools to fight the growing epidemic of drug and
alcohol overdoses in the United States.
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Appendix – Chapter 2 – Nationwide Survey of Medical Amnesty Laws
Table 1 – Rating Instrumentation to Examine Medical Amnesty Statutes
1. STATENAME: Name of State
2. STATNUM:
Statute number and Edition (year):
Protections granted by each statute: who receives immunity, what type of overdose
event applies, and whether an overdose event may be considered a mitigating
factor during a sentencing hearing.
3. PERSON: Immunity provision for individual who: (1) calls or requests aid only, (2)
overdose victim only, (3) both caller for aid and overdose victim (4) caller for aid and
also others who act in concert in requesting aid (5) caller for aid and others who act in
concert with caller in requesting aid and also the overdose victim (6)
unspecified/unclear
4. SUBSTANCE: Immunity provision related to overdose of: (1) drugs, (2) alcohol, (3)
either drugs or alcohol, (4) unspecified/unclear, (5) specific drug or combination
5. MITIGATEDRG: Is the action of calling/seeking assistance specifically mentioned in
the statute as a mitigating factor that may be used at sentencing for drug-related
offenses even if complete immunity is not granted. Mitigation must be specifically
mentioned in the statute. O=yes, 1=no
6. MITIGATEALC: Is the action of calling/seeking assistance specifically mentioned in
the statute as a mitigating factor that may be used at sentencing for alcohol-related
offenses even if complete immunity is not granted. Mitigation must be specifically
mentioned in the statute. O=yes, 1=no
Limitations on protections granted by each statute – what collateral consequences
may occur despite immunity provisions
7. CIVIL: Does the statute under review provide for immunity from civil forfeiture of
property aside from contraband? 0=yes, 1=no
8. USEEVIDENCE: Can police use evidence gathered independently for prosecution of
other crimes? Yes – evidence gathered independently may be used. O=yes, 1=no,
2=silent
9. DRUGTESTPROB: Does the statute limit the ability to drug test or otherwise sanction
a person on probation, pretrial release, or parole? 0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent
10. PARAPHERNALIA: Does immunity apply to possession or use charges pertaining to
drug paraphernalia? 0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent
Limitations on protections granted by each statute – areas open for prosecutorial
discretion
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11. QUALIFY: Does immunity require that evidence for the arrest/charge/prosecution be
obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance? 0=yes,
1=no
12. WHATOFFENSEDRG:
Pertaining to drug overdose events, does immunity apply to
“simple” possession of certain amounts of a drug only? If no immunity for distribution
of any amount, answer is “yes”. Coded as yes if an individual could be punished for a
drug offense related to the event. If a person could be prosecuted for certain
amounts of drugs, PWID, trafficking, supplying, distributing, etc. then this is YES.
0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3=not applicable
13. WHATOFFENSEALC: Pertaining to alcohol overdose events, does immunity apply to
the possession or use of alcohol only? If no immunity for distribution of any amount,
answer is “yes”. Coded as yes if an individual could be punished for an alcohol
offense related to the event. If a person could be prosecuted for distributing,
acquiring or providing alcohol, then this is YES. 0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3= not
applicable
14. OTHEROFF:
Is there a possibility for arrest/charge/prosecution/penalty for
another offense (whether drug or alcohol related or not) arising out of the event,
even if a person might receive some immunity? O=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3=not
applicable
15. OTHERREQUIREMENTS: Are specific requirements named in the statute to receive
immunity? Requirements such as: provide name, remain with victim or at the scene,
cooperate with law enforcement or medical personnel, being the first to call or
providing other relevant information would denote a YES. O=yes, 1=no
16. SAFEGUARD: Is there any safeguard against the intent to defraud, such as requiring
that a caller or OD victim act in good faith or reasonably believe that an overdose
event is occurring? O=yes, 1=no
Complexity of each statute – whether statutory language is attainable and
understandable
17. OVERDOSEDEF: Is a definition provided for what constitutes an overdose or medical
emergency? 0=yes, 1=no
18. OTHERSTATUTES: Does the statute under review refer to other statutes for
definitions, drug limits, etc.? 0=yes, 1=no
19. HOWMANYSTATS: How many other statutes are referred to by the statute under
review, if any? 0=N/A, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4 or more
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Table 2 - Coverage and protections granted by each MAL statute

MAL Citation

Receiver of Immunity

Alabama
Alaska

20-2-281 (2017)
11.71.311 (2017)
12.55.155 (d) (19)
(2015)
13-3423 (2018)
20-13-1701 et seq.
(2018)
Health/Safety 11376.5
(2018)

caller
either drugs or alcohol no
caller and OD victim
drugs
no
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations

no
no

Immunity
provision
regarding
Probation
or parole
violation?
no
no

caller, OD victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller, OD victim

18-1-711 (2018)
21a-267 (2017)
21a-279 (2017)
T. 16 S. 4769 (2018)

caller and OD victim
yes
caller and OD victim
yes
caller and OD victim
no
caller, others, OD
yes
victim
caller and OD victim
either drugs or alcohol yes
caller and OD victim
drugs
no
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations

Arizona
Arkansas
California

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. Columbia
Florida

7-403 (2018)
893.21 (2018)
921.0026 (2016)

Overdose Substance

Collateral Consequences
Immunity
Immunity
provision
provision
regarding
regarding
paraphernalia civil asset
charges?
forfeiture?

STATE
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drugs
either drugs or alcohol

yes
no

no
no

no
yes

drugs or drug in
combination w/
alcohol
either drugs or alcohol
either drugs or alcohol
either drugs or alcohol
either drugs or alcohol

yes

no

no

no
no
no
no

no
no
no
yes

no
no

yes
no

Georgia

3-3-23 (2018)
16-13-5 (2018)

Hawaii

329-43.6 (2017)

Idaho
Illinois

37-2739 C (2018)
720 ILCS 646/115
(2018)
720 ILCS 570/414
(2018)
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1
(2016)
IC 35-38-1-7.1 (2018)
16-42-27.2 (2017)
124.418 (2018)
218A.133 (2018)

Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky

244.992 (2018)
Louisiana
Maine

Maryland

14:403.10 (2017)
14:403.9 (2017)
28-A Section 2087
(2018) **
28-A Section 2051
(2018) ***
Crim Proc 1-210 (2018)

caller, others, OD
victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim

alcohol

no

no

yes

drugs

yes

no

yes

either drugs or alcohol

yes

yes

yes

drugs
specific
drug/combination
drugs

yes
no

no
no

no
no

no

no

no

no
no

yes
no

no

no

no
no
yes

no
no
no

“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
caller and OD victim
drugs
yes
caller, others, OD
drugs
yes
victim
caller, others, OD
alcohol
no
victim
caller and OD victim
drugs
no
caller
alcohol
no
caller and OD victim
alcohol
no
caller and OD victim

alcohol

no

yes

no

caller, others, OD
victim

either drugs or alcohol

yes

no

yes
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Massachusetts Ch94C, Section 34A
(2017)
Michigan
333.7403 (2018)
333.7404 (2018)
Minnesota

604A.05 (2018)

Mississippi

41-29-149.1 (2018)

Missouri

195.205 (2017)

Montana

50-32-609 et seq.
(2017)
53-180.05 (2018)
28-472 (2017)
453C.150 (2017)

Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

N. Carolina

318-B: 28-b (2018)
2C:35-31-8 (2018)
2C:35-30-7 (2018)
30-31-27.1 (2018)
220.78 (2018)
220.03 (2018)
390.40 (2016)
18B-302.2 (2017)
90-96.2 (2017)

caller and OD victim

drugs

no

no

no

caller, others, OD
victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller and OD victim

specific
drug/combination
specific
drug/combination
drugs, specific
drug/combination
drugs

no

no

no

no

no

no

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

either drugs or alcohol

yes

yes

yes

drugs

yes

no

yes

alcohol
drugs
either drugs or alcohol

no
yes
yes

no
no
yes

no
no
yes

drugs

no

no

no

no
no
no
no
no

yes
yes
no
no
no

no
no

yes
yes

caller, others, OD
victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim
caller, others, OD
victim
caller and OD victim

OD victim
drugs
yes
caller
drugs
yes
caller and OD victim
drugs
no
caller and OD victim
either drugs or alcohol yes
caller
either drugs or alcohol no
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
caller and OD victim
alcohol
no
caller and OD victim
drugs
yes
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N. Dakota

19-03.1-23.4 (2015)

Ohio
Oregon

2925.11 (2016)
475.898 (2017)
475.B393 (2017)

Pennsylvania

35PA Stat. 780-113.7
(2018)
21-28.8-4 (2018)
44-53-1910 et seq.
(2018)
34-20A-109 et seq.
(2018)
63-1-156 (2018)

Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

caller, others, OD
victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim

drugs

yes

no

no

no
yes
yes

no
no
no

no
yes
yes

caller and OD victim

drugs
drugs
specific drug –
cannabis
drugs

yes

no

yes

caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim

either drugs or alcohol
either drugs or alcohol

yes
yes

no
no

yes
no

caller and OD victim

drugs

no

no

no

caller, others, OD
victim
caller

drugs

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

no

yes
no
no

yes
no
no

no
no

yes
yes

Alc. Bev. T. 4 106.04
alcohol
no
(2017)
Utah
58-37-8-16 (2018)
caller and OD victim
either drugs or alcohol yes
76-3-203.11 (2018)
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
Vermont
T.18, Sec.4254 (2018)
caller and OD victim
either drugs or alcohol no
Virginia
18.2-251.03 (2018)
caller
either drugs or alcohol yes
Washington
69.50.315 (2018)
caller and OD victim
drugs
no
9.94A.535 (2018)
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations
West Virginia
16-47-1 et seq. (2017)
caller and OD victim
either drugs or alcohol no
Wisconsin
961.443 (2018)
caller
drugs
yes
*No provision as defined in this paper.
**In Maine, the penalty is a civil forfeiture and the statute provides immunity for that penalty.
*** In Maine, a minor who violates this statute commits a civil violation.
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Table 3 – Limitations on protections and complexity of each MAL
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STATE

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

Iowa
Kentucky

MAL Citation

20-2-281 (2017)
11.71.311 (2017)
13-3423 (2018)
20-13-1701 et
seq. (2018)
Health/Safety
11376.5 (2018)
18-1-711 (2018)
21a-267 (2017)
21a-279 (2017)
T. 16 S. 4769
(2018)
7-403 (2018)
893.21 (2018)
3-3-23 (2018)
16-13-5 (2018)
329-43.6 (2017)
37-2739 C (2018)
720 ILCS
646/115 (2018)
720 ILCS
570/414 (2018)
124.418 (2018)
218A.133 (2018)
244.992 (2018)

Is mitigation
possible if full
amnesty is not
granted?
no provision
no provision
Yes
no provision

Prosecutorial Discretion
Immunity Immunity for
require
certain
evidence
distribution
from OD
crimes?
event?
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no

Specific
requirements
to receive
immunity?

Accessibility
Overdose
Number of
Definition
other statutes
Provided?
referenced

yes
yes
no
no

no
yes
no
yes

1
4
0
3

no provision

no

no

yes

yes

4

no provision
no provision
no provision
no provision

yes
yes
yes
no

drug only
no
no
yes

yes
no
no
yes

yes
no
no
yes

6
2
2
7

Yes
no provision
no provision
no provision
Yes
no provision
no provision

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

alcohol only
no
alcohol only
no
alcohol only
no
no

no
no
no
yes
no
no
no

yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes

7
0
4
3
3
3
0

no provision

yes

no

no

yes

0

Yes
no provision
no provision

yes
yes
yes

drug only
no
alcohol only

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
no

4
0
4
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Louisiana
Maine

Maryland
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska

14:403.10 (2017)
14:403.9 (2017)
28-A Section
2087 (2018)
28-A Section
2051 (2018)
Crim Proc 1-210
(2018)
Ch94C, Section
34A (2017)

333.7403 (2018)
333.7404 (2018)
604A.05 (2018)

41-29-149.1
(2018)
195.205 (2017)
50-32-608 et
seq. (2017)

53-180.05 (2018)
28-472 (2018)

no provision
no provision
no provision

yes
no
yes

no
no
no

no
yes
no

no
no
yes

1
1
2

no provision

yes

no

no

no

2

Yes

yes

yes

no

no

6

mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision
no provision
mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision

yes

no

no

no

3

yes
yes
yes

no
no
drug only

no
no
yes

yes
yes
yes

8
8
4

yes

no

no

yes

4

no provision
mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision
no provision

yes
yes

alcohol only
no

no
no

yes
yes

8
4

no
yes

yes
no

yes
yes

no
yes

1
2
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Nevada

453C.150 (2017)

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

318-B: 28-b
(2018)
2C:35-31-8
(2018)
2C:35-30-7
(2018)
30-31-27.1
(2018)

New Mexico

New York
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

220.78 (2018)
220.03 (2018)
18B-302.2 (2017)
90-96.2 (2017)
19-03.1-23.4
(2017)
2925.11 (2016)
475.898 (2017)
475B.393 (2017)
35PA Stat. 780113.7 (2018)
21-28.8-4 (2018)

mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision

yes

no

no

yes

9

yes

no

yes

yes

1

no provision

yes

no

no

no

6

no provision

yes

no

no

no

6

mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision
no provision
no provision
no provision
no provision

yes

no

no

no

1

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no
no
no

no
no
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no
yes
no

5
2
1
2
6

no provision*
no provision
no provision
no provision

yes
yes
yes
yes

no
no
yes
drug only

yes
no
no
yes

no
yes
yes
yes

4
11
3
7

mitigation for
drug, not

yes

no

no

no

0
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South Carolina
South Dakota

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

44-53-1910 et
seq. (2018)
34-20A-109 et
seq. (2018)

63-1-156 (2018)
Alc. Bev. T. 4
106.04 (2017)
58-37-8-16
(2018)
T.18, Sec.4254
(2018)
18.2-251.03
(2018)
69.50.315 (2018)
16-47-1 et seq.
(2017)
961.443 (2018)

alcohol
offenses
Yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

9

mitigation for
drug, not
alcohol
offenses
Yes
no provision

yes

no

yes

yes

0

yes
no

drug only
no

no
yes

yes
no

4
1

no provision

yes

no

yes

no

2

Yes

yes

alcohol only

yes

yes

4

no provision

yes

no

yes

yes

8

no provision
Yes

yes
no

no
no

no
yes

no
yes

2
6

no provision

no

no

no

no

3

*No provision for mitigation as defined in this paper.
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CHAPTER 3 - COMPARISON OF DRUG POISONING DEATH RATES IN NINE
STATES WITH A MEDICAL AMNESTY LAW

Abstract
Background: Timely medical attention could decrease mortality during drug overdose events,
but overdose victims and witnesses alike often delay or fail to seek professional help because
they fear police involvement. Statutes that provide immunity from criminal action can have an
important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment.
Methods: We examined those states with at least five years of data available before and after
enactment of Medical Amnesty Laws (also known as Good Samaritan Laws) to determine
whether such laws corresponded with decreased drug overdose death rates. Sufficient data exist
for nine states to allow the comparison.
Results: New Mexico was the first state to enact a Medical Amnesty Law (on June 15, 2007),
and exhibited declining overdose death rates for some age groups during the period analyzed. In
Washington, overdose death rates decreased for most age groups following that state’s medical
amnesty law becoming effective (on June 10, 2010). In Connecticut, overdose deaths continued
to rise for all age groups for the five year period following enactment of that state’s Medical
Amnesty Law on October 1, 2011. Similarly, New York’s overdose death rates significantly
increased for the five year period following enactment of that state’s Medical Amnesty Law on
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September 18, 2011. Five states enacted Medical Amnesty Laws in 2012: Colorado (May 29),
Florida (October 1), Illinois (June 1), Massachusetts (August 2), and Rhode Island (June 18).
Drug poisoning death rates increased for the five year period following 2012 for all five states.
Conclusions: Correlations between overdose deaths and Medical Amnesty Laws do not mean
either the presence or absence of causative effects, but may be helpful as policy makers craft
laws that address overdose deaths. Recommendations are made concerning statutory language
and educational interventions.

Background
Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs (CPDs)
and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the United States.
Since 2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the United States than either
motor vehicle crashes or the misuse of firearms. (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015)
Despite leading in many areas of medical technology, the United States has the highest drugrelated mortality rate in the world (Cochran et al., 2014).
While street drugs posed the greatest risk of overdose for past generations, since 2002,
CPD abuse has resulted in more deaths than cocaine and heroin combined. However, increased
law enforcement pressure on the diversion of CPDs from legitimate channels has prompted drug
cartels to increase the supply of heroin and other illicit drugs to the American market (The U.S.
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Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015). Today, heroin is more readily available and drives more
overdose deaths than in 2007 (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).
Heroin carries well-known risks, and overdoses occur frequently among its users.
Research of illicit drug use conducted by Tracy and colleagues, found that approximately onehalf (50%) of respondents had a minimum of one non-fatal drug overdose event (Tracy et al.,
2005). Among intravenous drug users, those experiencing a non-fatal overdose have ranged
between 50% and 70% (Warner-Smith et al., 2001). Moreover, those who quit using heroin have
a much higher likelihood of overdose if they renew usage, because tolerance levels usually
diminish (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010). Naloxone
(Narcan ®), the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, is easy to administer and is
commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin and other opiates
(Sporer & Kral, 2007). Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first responders to
carry and administer Naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise occur while
transporting an overdose victim to a hospital. While published research has demonstrated the
effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green et al., 2013), other studies show that emergency
medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of overdose events (Seal et al., 2003;
Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001). The low rate of EMS activation occurs in part because
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witnesses to overdose are often drug abusers themselves, and fear legal consequences such as
arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of probation or bond conditions, or violations
of Temporary Protective Orders (Banta-Green et al., 2013; Darke & Zador, 1996; Davidson et
al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin et al., 2005).
Some states permit the dissemination of Naloxone to drug users’ family members,
friends, and others who may be in the best position to respond directly to witnessed overdose
events (Davis & Carr, 2015; Galea et al., 2006; Phillips, 2013; Seal et al., 2003; Sporer & Kral,
2007). While effective in many cases, this approach is not without potential problems. Because
Naloxone is generally safe and effective against opioid based overdoses, some may rely too
much on its ameliorating effects and fail to seek professional help following an overdose.
Further, Naloxone is only effective with opioid-based overdoses. Overreliance on Naloxone or
simply not knowing what drugs are taken by a victim could prove disastrous with a poly-drug
overdose or when the overdose agent is not an opioid, because Naloxone does not ameliorate the
effects of non-opioid drugs or alcohol. Naloxone may also be perceived as a “safety net” which
enables opioid drug users to take risks with dosage levels.
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained
personnel could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States. Many states have enacted
statutes that provide immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or
both. Often called “Good Samaritan Laws” or “Medical Amnesty Laws”, these statutes are
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meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall
goal of saving lives.
State legislatures may enact Medical Amnesty legislation because of an increase in drug
poisoning deaths. In other words, at the time such legislation is passed, a given state may
already be in the throes of an increase in deaths brought about for a number of reasons.
Legislators seek to enact legislation to address existing or anticipated problems. One goal would
be to study whether Medical Amnesty Laws (also known as “Good Samaritan Laws”) have had
the intended effect of saving lives by encouraging victims and witnesses to overdose events to
contact authorities for professional assistance. However, a lack of direct data hinders
accomplishing this research. Because the motivation behind passing a MAL may be to address
an existing problem, sufficient time must elapse because one can determine whether a MAL has
carried its intended effect. One problem is, however, that there is a lack of direct information
concerning whether 9-1-1 calls for emergency assistance have increased based upon a particular
state’s MAL.
Further, a variety of factors could act as confounding variables that confuse the
relationship between passage of a MAL and drug poisoning deaths. Law enforcement pressure, a
shortage or overage of either the illicit drug supply or diversion of legitimate pharmaceuticals,
population changes, public service announcements and a plethora of other factors make direct
measurement of the effect of a MAL on drug poisoning deaths bewildering. Rather than seek a
direct measure, therefore, the goal of this research is simply to determine whether drug poisoning
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deaths have increased, decreased, or remained the same during the five-year period following
enactment of a state’s MAL. The election of a five-year period is to ensure examination of any
existing trends, and to allow any effect of an MAL sufficient time to work. No representation is
made that the MAL would have a causative effect.

Knowledge of MALs
A study among Washington police officers and paramedics by Banta-Green (Banta-Green
et al., 2013) in the Fall of 2011 found that few had knowledge of the state’s “Good Samaritan
Law” (MAL), which had been passed in June of 2010. Although the majority of respondents had
been present at an overdose during the prior year, only 16% of the officers and 7% of the
paramedics surveyed were aware of the new law. Knowledge increased following an
informational intervention.
A survey by Evans (Evans et al., 2016) among young adult users of non-prescription
opioids found that fewer than half (45.5%) were aware of Rhode Island’s “Good Samaritan Law”
(MAL). Participants were recruited from January 2015 through February 2016 and were
surveyed about, among other things, knowledge of the 2012 GSL. Awareness of Rhode Island’s
MAL was associated with older age (age range was 18 to 29), being white, a history of
incarceration, a history of injection drug use, lifetime heroin use, witnessing or experiencing an
overdose, having heard of naloxone, knowing where to obtain naloxone, and experience
administering naloxone (all p < 0.05). The final explanatory regression model showed an
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association between awareness of Rhode Island’s GSL and lifetime injection drug use, having
heard of naloxone, and knowing where to obtain naloxone. An informational intervention was
recommended.

Efficacy of MALs
Little research has attempted to determine whether Medical Amnesty Laws have actually
been effective in accomplishing the goal of reducing overdose deaths by encouraging calls for
professional assistance. Rees and others attempted to measure the effects of naloxone access and
“Good Samaritan Laws” on opioid-related deaths. (Rees et al., 2017) Drawing upon mortality
data obtained from the National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-of-death mortality files
for the period 1999 – 2014, they found evidence that adoption of a NAL leads to a reduction in
opioid-related deaths of 9 to 11 percent, but failed to find statistically significant effects of GSLs
(MALs) at conventional levels. In their fully specified model, Rees and others estimated a
Poisson regression using the presence or absence of a NAL, GSL (MAL), State, Year, and a
vector of controls that included the natural log of police officers per capital by state and year, an
indicator for whether medical marijuana was legal, the natural log of the beer taxes by state and
year, the natural log of the cigarette tax, and the natural log of the employment rate, natural log
of the number of college graduates, the natural log of per capita income, and the natural log of
the minimum wage. The natural log of population and of police per capita, and the natural log of
beer taxes were significant at the 5% level. Other controls were not statistically significant.
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Interestingly, Rees and others determined that the effect of a NAL improved 2 or more years
after enactment.
McClennan and others used 2000 – 2014 National Vital Statistics System data, 2002 –
2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health data, and primary datasets of the location and
timing of NALs and MALs nationwide and reported that states with a MAL had a 15% (p =
0.050) lower incidence of opioid-overdose mortality. (McClellan et al., 2018) However, use of
this time frame means that seven (7) states would present less than 1 year of data following
enactment of a MAL in 2014. Six (6) states would present less than 2 years of data following
enactment of a MAL in 2013. Five (5) states would present less than 3 years of data following
enactment of a MAL in 2012. Only four (4) states would present 3 or more years of data
following enactment of a MAL (MAL enacted in 2011 or earlier).
The project presented here presents a comparison of drug poisoning death data from the
five year periods before and after nine (9) states with MALs enacted in 2012 or earlier.
Including these nine states in the analysis allows for the controlling of numerous variables that
could not be explained otherwise. These states cover a broad section of the country, from East to
West and North to South and encompass approximately 25% of the nation’s population. This
analysis includes two of the five most populous states (New York and Florida) and sparsely
populated states (New Mexico and Rhode Island). See Table 1.
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Table 1: Population and rank of nine states
State
National Rank by Population Estimated Population
**
(July 1, 2017)*
st
Colorado
21
5,607,154
th
Connecticut
29
3,588,184
Florida
3rd
20,984,400
th
Illinois
6
12,802,023
Massachusetts
15th
6,859,819
th
New Mexico
36
2,088,070
th
New York
4
19,849,399
Rhode Island
44th
1,059,639
th
Washington
13
7,405,743
Total
80,244,431
United States
325,719,178
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau - statistics accessed from https://www.census.gov 3/30/19.)
** Source: Worldpopulationreview.com – accessed 3/30/19.

Methodology

All states with at least five (5) years of data available both before and after enactment of
Medical Amnesty Laws (MALs) were examined. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
currently have published overdose death data available from 1999 through 2017. Nine states
(Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island,
and Washington) have sufficient data available for measurement of the five year periods before
and after enactment of respective medical amnesty laws. See Appendix, Exhibit 1.
Data were downloaded from CDC’s WISQARS™ resource, (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, National Centers for Injury Prevention and Control, Web-based Injury Statistics
62

Query and Reporting System (WISQARS)) available at www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars).
WISQARS provides data concerning fatal and nonfatal injury, violent death, and cost of injury
from a variety of sources, such as death certificate data reported to the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS). SAS 9.4 was used to compare drug poisoning death rates for the five
(5) year periods before and after each state enacted its Medical Amnesty Law, using age-adjusted
rates with 2000 as the reference year. This study involves data available to the public and thus is
exempt from Institutional Review Board approval.
For each state, the age-adjusted death rates for the five year period before (“before
period”) and after (“after period”) enactment of respective state Medical Amnesty Laws were
obtained, tabulated, and compared. The age-adjusted death rate for the year each state’s MAL
was enacted was not included in any calculations. Next, unweighted averages of the before
period were compared with the after period to determine whether data suggest an increase or
decrease in drug poisoning deaths following enactment of each state’s MAL. Because the before
and after periods involve the population of each respective state over a period of several years, a
paired-samples t-test is appropriate. Assumptions for a valid t-test are: (1) the dependent
variable (drug poisoning deaths) involves an interval or ratio scale; (2) the raw score populations
are at least approximately normally distributed; and (3) the populations have homogeneous
variance. Further, two data points are available for each study year. (Heiman, 2006) As shown
elsewhere, plotting the data demonstrates that the drug poisoning death data used in this study is
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not normally distributed. Data are in the form of counts and so a Poisson distribution is an
appropriate probability distribution to utilize.
Results
Nationwide results and comparison with the nine states with at least five years with a medical
amnesty law are shown graphically in Exhibit 3. As shown, drug poisoning deaths among the 20
– 64 age range generally increased from 2000 – 2017.

Non-fatal injury data
Nationwide data from CDC WISQARS is also available for non-fatal injury poisoning deaths,
but is not provided through the WISQARS program for individual states. The definition
provided by CDC for poisoning includes drug overdoses and also other categories of poisoning:

Poisoning: Ingestion, inhalation, absorption through the skin, or injection of so much of
a drug, toxin (biologic or non-biologic), or other chemical that a harmful effect results,
such as drug overdoses. This category does not include harmful effects from normal
therapeutic drugs (i.e., unexpected adverse effects to a drug administered correctly to
treat a condition) or bacterial illnesses.
As shown in the graph in the Appendix, nationwide non-fatal drug poisoning rates per 100,000
have increased markedly for all age groups within the 20-64 age range from 2007 through 2017.
See Appendix, Exhibit 4.
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Results by state
Colorado

Colorado’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on May 29, 2012. The measured ageadjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 14.67; 2008:
14.79; 2009: 14.94; 2010: 12.63; 2011: 16.04); and after period (2013: 15.54; 2014: 16.26; 2015:
15.30; 2016: 16.51; 2017: 17.52). The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Colorado’s
MAL was enacted (14.95) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of
the before period (14.61) with the after period (16.23) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Colorado’s MAL. See Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Colorado
Colorado Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Colorado After 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2007
14.67
2013
15.54
2008

14.79

2014

16.26

2009

14.94

2015

15.30

2010

12.63

2016

16.51

2011

16.04

2017

17.52

Unweighted average of five years
before 2012: 14.61

Unweighted average of five years
after 2012: 16.23

One-tailed Paired t-test: P= 0.028
65

Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Connecticut

Connecticut’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on October 1, 2011. The measured
age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2006-2010) and
after (2012-2016) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2006: 11.47433;
2007: 12.21314; 2008: 10.802; 2009: 10.98094; 2010: 9.999823); and after period (2012:
12.10869; 2013: 15.97769; 2014: 17.56275; 2015: 22.0457; 2016: 27.32979). The age-adjusted
death rate for 2011, the year Connecticut’s MAL was enacted (11.19768) was not included in
any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the before period (11.09) with the after period
(19.00492) strongly suggests an increase in drug poisoning deaths despite enactment of
Connecticut’s MAL. See Table 3.
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Table 3: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Connecticut
Connecticut Before 2011 – Drug
Connecticut After 2011 – Drug Poisoning
Poisoning Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2006
11.47
2012
12.11
2007

12.21

2013

15.97

2008

10.80

2014

17.55

2009

10.98

2015

22.03

2010

10.00

2016

27.31

Unweighted average of five years
before 2011: 11.09

Unweighted average of five years
after 2011: 19.00

* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Levene’s test for equal variances was applied to compare the variances for the five year
before and after periods. The result was statistically significant (p=0.0022). This supports the
conclusion that the variance of the five-year before period significantly differed from the
variance of the five-year after period. Next, two independent samples t-tests were applied to
compare means for the before period (2005 – 2010) and the after period (2012 – 2016). The
unpooled t-test was statistically significant (p= 0.0192). (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)., n.d.) These measurements support the conclusion that adjusted drug
poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of Connecticut’s MAL.
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Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase. Graphing the data shows that drug
poisoning deaths continued to rise throughout the period studied for each of the following
commonly studied age groups: 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years,
45-49 years, 50-54 years, and 55-59 years (See Appendix, Graph 1).

Florida
Florida’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on October 1, 2012. The measured ageadjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 15.40; 2008:
16.18; 2009: 16.71; 2010: 16.38; 2011: 15.37); and after period (2013: 12.51; 2014: 13.16; 2015:
16.20; 2016: 23.63; 2017: 25.04). The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Florida’s MAL
was enacted (13.22) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the
before period (16.00) with the after period (18.12) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Florida’s MAL. See Table 4.
Table 4: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Florida
Florida Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Florida After 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2007
15.40
2013
12.51
2008

16.18

2014
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13.16

2009

16.71

2015

16.20

2010

16.38

2016

23.63

2011

15.37

2017

25.04

Unweighted average of five years
before 2012: 16.00

Unweighted average of five years
after 2012: 18.12

One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.236
* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Illinois
Illinois’ Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 1, 2012. The measured ageadjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 9.37; 2008:
10.60; 2009: 10.79; 2010: 9.98; 2011: 10.92); and after period (2013: 12.03; 2014: 13.09; 2015:
14.08; 2016: 18.81; 2017: 21.58). The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Illinois’s MAL
was enacted (12.51) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the
before period (10.33) with the after period (15.91) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Illinois’ MAL. See Table 5.
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Table 5: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Illinois
Illinois Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Illinois After 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2007
9.37
2013
12.03
2008
10.60
2014
13.09
2009
10.79
2015
14.08
2010
9.98
2016
18.81
2011
10.92
2017
21.58
Unweighted average of five years
Unweighted average of five years
before 2012: 10.33
after 2012: 15.91
One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.0156
* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Massachusetts
Massachusetts’ Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on August 2, 2012. The
measured age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (20072011) and after (2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007:
13.97; 2008: 11.91; 2009: 12.20; 2010: 11.03; 2011: 12.67); and after period (2013: 15.95; 2014:
19.01; 2015: 25.66; 2016: 32.79; 2017: 31.65). The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year
Massachusetts’ MAL was enacted (12.71) was not included in any calculations. Comparing
simple averages of the before period (12.36) with the after period (25.01) strongly suggests an
increase in drug poisoning deaths despite enactment of Massachusetts’ MAL. See Table 6.
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Table 6: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Massachusetts
Massachusetts Before 2012 – Drug
Massachusetts After 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Poisoning Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2007
13.97
2013
15.95
2008

11.91

2014

19.01

2009

12.20

2015

25.66

2010

11.03

2016

32.79

2011

12.67

2017

31.65

Unweighted average of five years
before 2012: 12.36
One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.013

Unweighted average of five years
after 2012: 25.01

* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

New Mexico

New Mexico was the first state to enact a Medical Amnesty Law, which went into effect
on June 15, 2007. Age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before
(2002 - 2006) and after (2008 - 2012) the statute’s enactment date were measured as follows:
before period (2002: 16.09855; 2003: 19.72859; 2004: 16.92997; 2005: 20.02567; 2006:
21.73169); and after period (2008: 26.72703; 2009: 22.09201; 2010: 23.75318; 2011: 26.35467;
2012: 24.79519). The age-adjusted death rate for 2007, the year New Mexico’s MAL was
enacted (23.39049) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the
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before period (18.90289) with the after period (24.74442) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of New Mexico’s MAL. (See Table 7).

Table 7: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
New Mexico
New Mexico Before 2007 – Drug Poisoning
New Mexico After 2007 – Drug Poisoning
Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2002
16.10
2008
26.73
2003
19.73
2009
22.09
2004
16.93
2010
23.75
2005
20.03
2011
26.35
2006
21.73
2012
24.80
Unweighted average of five years before
Unweighted average of five years after 2007:
2007: 18.90
24.74
* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Next measured was the probability that the variances of the five year before and after
periods were not significantly different. An F-test comparison of the five-year before and after
periods resulted in a probability of 0.707651, which supports the conclusion that the variance of
the five-year before period is not significantly different from the variance of the five-year after
period. A T-test comparison of the before period (2002 – 2006) versus the after period (2008 –
2012) using 1-tailed, 2-sample equal variance parameters resulted in a measurement of 0.00124.
A T-test using 1-tailed, paired test parameters resulted in a measurement of 0.00847. (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)., n.d.) These measurements support the conclusion that
72

adjusted drug poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of New Mexico’s
MAL.

Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase. Graphing the data depicts an
unclear result for the 5 years before and after New Mexico’s medical amnesty law was enacted.
While drug poisoning deaths per 100,000 may have declined for some age ranges, death rates
may have increased for other age ranges. However, data concerning female deaths for several
years are missing, particularly for 2002, and also as follows: 35-39 year old females – 2007 data
missing, 40-44 year old females - 2000 data missing, 45-49 year old females – 1999 and 2002
data missing; 50-54 year old females – 2003 and 2005 data missing.

An examination of the crude rate of deaths per age group indicates that drug poisoning
deaths have continued to rise throughout the period studied for each of the following commonly
studied age groups: 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years, 45-49 years,
50-54 years, and 55-59 years (See Appendix, Graph 2).

New York
New York’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on September 18, 2011. The ageadjusted death rates for the five years before and the five years after 2011 were as follows:
before period (2006: 8.583147 ; 2007: 8.652867; 2008: 8.517334; 2009: 7.969664; 2010:
73

7.778711); and after period (2012: 10.35329; 2013: 11.21153; 2014: 11.22377; 2015: 13.55951;
2016: 17.86108). The age-adjusted death rate for 2011, the year New York’s MAL was enacted
(9.632934) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the before
period (8.300345) with the after period (12.84184) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of New York’s MAL. (See Table 8).

Table 8: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of New York MAL
New York Before 2011 –
New York After 2011 –
Drug Poisoning Deaths/100,000
Drug Poisoning Deaths/100,000
2006
8.58
2012
10.35
2007
8.65
2013
11.21
2008
8.52
2014
11.22
2009
7.97
2015
13.56
2010
7.78
2016
17.86
Unweighted average of 5 years before 2011: 8.30 Unweighted average 5 years post-MAL: 12.84
* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

The probability that the variances of the five year before and after periods were not
significantly different was measured. Levene’s test for equal variances was rejected (p=0.0142).
Thus, a one-tailed independent samples t-test was found to be statistically significant (p=0.0206).
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), n.d.) These measurements support the
conclusion that adjusted drug poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of New
York’s MAL. Finally, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates
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may have decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase. Graphing the data shows
a clear increase for all age groups (20 – 59) from the 5 years before and after New York’s
medical amnesty law was enacted. (See Appendix, Figure 3).

Rhode Island
Rhode Island’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 18, 2012. The measured
age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and
after (2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 12.39; 2008:
17.32; 2009: 14.71; 2010: 15.68; 2011: 17.56); and after period (2013: 22.40; 2014: 23.51; 2015:
28.19; 2016: 30.90; 2017: 31.20). The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Rhode Island’s
MAL was enacted (18.11) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of
the before period (15.53) with the after period (27.24) strongly suggests an increase in drug
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Rhode Island’s MAL. See Table 9.
Table 9: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Rhode Island
Rhode Island Before 2012 – Drug
Rhode Island After 2012 – Drug Poisoning
Poisoning Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2007
12.39
2013
22.40
2008
17.32
2014
23.51
2009
14.71
2015
28.19
2010
15.68
2016
30.90
2011
17.56
2017
31.20
Unweighted average of five years
Unweighted average of five years
before 2012: 15.53
after 2012: 27.24
One-tailed paired t-test: p= 0.00097
* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
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WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Washington

Washington’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 10, 2010. Age-adjusted
rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2005-2009) and after (2011-2015)
the statute’s enactment date were measured. The age-adjusted death rates for these years were as
follows: before period (2005: 12.96102; 2006: 13.54069; 2007: 14.3514; 2008: 14.72573; 2009:
14.34624); and after period (2011: 14.03146; 2012: 13.69048; 2013: 13.38226; 2014: 13.23332;
2015: 14.72154). The age-adjusted death rate for 2010, the year Washington’s MAL was
enacted (13.11901) was not included in any calculations. Comparing simple averages of the
before period (13.98502) with the after period (13.81181) suggests that drug poisoning deaths
did not increase following enactment of Washington’s MAL. (See Table 10).

Table 10: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in
Washington
Washington Before 2010 – Drug Poisoning
Washington After 2010 – Drug Poisoning
Deaths/100,000
Deaths/100,000
2005
12.96
2011
14.03
2006
13.54
2012
13.69
2007
14.35
2013
13.38
2008
14.73
2014
13.23
2009
14.35
2015
14.72
Unweighted average of five years before
Unweighted average of five years after 2010:
2010: 13.98
13.81
76

* Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages. International
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14. Source: CDC
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18. Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.

Levene’s test was not statistically significant, so the pooled variance estimate was used.
The independent samples t-test comparing the means for the before period (2005 – 2009) and the
after period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.6884). (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)., n.d.) We failed to find a difference in poisoning death rates
following enactment of Washington’s MAL.
Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase. Graphing the data shows that drug
poisoning deaths rates among some age groups increased while rates among other age groups
decreased from the 5 years before and after Washington’s medical amnesty law was enacted.
(See Appendix, Figure 4).

As shown in Table 11, Washington is the only state that did not exhibit an increase in
drug poisoning deaths when comparing the five-year period before enactment of a MAL with the
five-year period after enactment of a MAL. Florida had a non-significant increase, but the
remaining seven states had a statistically significant increase in drug poisoning deaths.
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Table 11: Summary of 5 year periods before and after respective enactment of medical amnesty
law in nine states
State
Unweighted
Unweighted average Difference
t-test values
average of five
of five years after
in 5-year
years before MAL
MAL
average
deaths per
100,000
Colorado
Unweighted average Unweighted average
+1.62
One-tailed
of five years
of five years
paired t-test: p=
before 2012: 14.61
after 2012: 16.23
0.02816
Connecticut

Unweighted average
of five years
before 2011: 11.09

Unweighted average
of five years
after 2011: 19.00

+7.91

One-tailed,
paired t-test: p=
0.027

Florida

Unweighted average
of five years
before 2012: 16.00

Unweighted average
of five years
after 2012: 18.12

+2.12

One-tailed
paired t-test: p=
0.237

Illinois

Unweighted average
of five years
before 2012: 10.33

Unweighted average
of five years
after 2012: 15.91

+5.58

One-tailed
paired t-test: p=
0.0156

Massachusetts

Unweighted average
of five years
before 2012: 12.36

Unweighted average
of five years
after 2012: 25.01

+12.65

One-tailed
paired t-test: p=
0.013

New Mexico

Unweighted average
of five years before
2007: 18.90

Unweighted average
of five years after
2007: 24.74

+5.84

One-tailed,
paired t-test p=
0.00847

New York

Unweighted average
of five years before
2011: 8.30

Unweighted average
of five years after
2011: 12.84

+4.54

One-tailed,
paired t- test:
p=0.0206

Rhode Island

Unweighted average
of five years
before 2012: 15.53

Unweighted average
of five years
after 2012: 27.24

+11.71

One-tailed
paired t-test: p=
0.00097
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Washington

Unweighted average
of five years before
2010: 13.98

Unweighted average
of five years after
2010: 13.81

-0.17

Two-tailed
paired t-test: p=
0.728

Washington – examination by age group
Because Washington appears to be the only one of the nine states that did not increase in
drug poisoning deaths, further analysis by age group was conducted.
For the 20-24 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.674737).
For the 25-29 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.274035).
For the 30-34 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p=0.892222).
For the 35-39 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.621263).
For the 40-44 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p=0.012275), suggesting a significant
decrease in poisoning deaths within this age group.
For the 45-49 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.098647).
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For the 50-54 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.540306).
For the 55-59 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.010035), suggesting a significant
increase in poisoning deaths within this age group.
For the 60-64 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.010035), suggesting a significant
increase in poisoning deaths within this age group.

Washington: Analysis by gender among age groups with significant change in drug
poisoning deaths following enactment of MAL

40-44 year age group among gender: decrease among males accounts for the difference
Because a significant decrease in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 40-44 year age
group, further examination was conducted by gender. For the 40-44 year age group, among
females, change comparing the before period (2005 – 2009) with the after period (2011 – 2015)
was not statistically significant (p= 0.144291), suggesting no significant change in poisoning
deaths among females in this age group.
For the 40-44 year age group, among males, change from the before period (2005 – 2009)
to the after period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.001665), suggesting a
significant decrease in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.
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55-59 year age group by gender: increase among males accounts for the difference
Because a significant increase in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 55-59 year age
group, further examination was conducted by gender. For the 55-59 year age group, among
females, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was not
statistically significant (p= 0.179089), suggesting no significant increase in poisoning deaths
among females in this age group. For the 55-59 year age group, among males, change from the
before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p=
0.026662), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.
60-64 year age group by gender: an increase in both males and females
Because a significant decrease in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 60-64 year age
group, further examination was conducted by gender. For the 60-64 year age group, among
females, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was
statistically significant (p= 0.014287), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths
among females in this age group.
For the 60-64 year age group, among males, change from four years of the before period
(2006 – 2009) with four years of the after period (2011 – 2014) was statistically significant (p=
0.000545), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.
Missing data for age groups 65 and older makes continuing this analysis difficult for these
important age groups.
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Regression Equation

A regression model was fitted to explore associations between potential independent
variables and the dependent variable of age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five
year period before and after the enactment date of each respective state’s medical amnesty law.
The null hypothesis is that drug poisoning deaths have not improved in the five-years following
passage of MALs. Data for all nine states were included in the model together to increase
statistical power.
This analysis is limited by design to the five-year time periods before and after each
state’s respective MAL passage year. The theory is that the influence of a MAL on a
population’s behavior may require several years to take effect. Some states had a large amount
of missing data for certain age groups, especially among age-groups younger than 30 and older
than 59. Particularly, females were underrepresented disproportionately among some age groups
in New Mexico. See Appendix, Figure 1 (Connecticut), Figure 2 (New Mexico), and Figure 3
(New York and Washington) for missing data breakdown by age-group and gender. Rhode
Island had missing data for numerous age groups among numerous years.
Thus, regression analysis was run on age groups spanning 30 – 59 for all nine states to
optimize available data. Restricting the regression analysis to the 30 – 59 age range allows the
model to include 100% of the necessary data for Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
York, Washington, and 100% of the data for males in all years in Connecticut, and 100% of data
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for 6 of 10 years for females in Connecticut. For New Mexico, data for males was present in 9
out of 10 years and for 7 out of 10 years for females. Rhode Island was plagued with missing
data, especially among females. Data was missing for females in the 30-34 and 40-44 age
groups for 8 out of 10 years, for the 35-39 age group for 9 out of 10 years, for the 55-59 age
group in 5 out of 10 years, and for the 45-49 and 50-54 age groups for 2 out of 10 years. Among
males, data was missing for the 30-34 year age group for 4 out of 10 years, for the 35-39 year
age group for 2 out of 10 years, and for the 55-59 year age group, for 1 out of 10 years. See
Appendix, Exhibit 5.
The Poisson distribution is characterized by count data collected in a well-defined time
interval which is the same for each individual. (Hayat & Higgins, 2014) Histograms of drug
poisoning deaths among all nine states are displayed in Appendix Figures 4 and 5.
Based upon available data, a generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution and log
link function were fitted as follows:

ln      0  1 X 1   2 X 2  ...   k X k
ln (Deaths) = Bo + B1 (Sex) + B2 (Age Group) + B3 (State) + B4 (Year) + B5 (MAL) + B6 (Sex
* Age Group) + B7(State * MAL) + B8 (Sex*MAL) + B9 Age_Group*MAL
Offset: ln (population)
Variables are as follows:
“Deaths” = drug poisoning deaths;
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“Sex” = gender (males/females);
“Age Group” = Age Groups (30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59);
“Year” = class variable (2002 – 2017)
“State” = Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Washington;
“MAL” = 0 (before period), 1 (after period);
“Sex * Age Group” = interaction between Sex and Age Group;
“State*MAL” = interaction between State and MAL;
“Sex*MAL” = interaction between Sex and MAL;
N = 1025.
The null hypothesis is that there is no association between the passage of a medical
amnesty law and drug poisoning deaths. In other words, that drug poisoning deaths have not
decreased but, rather, have either remained the same or increased in the five years following
enactment of a MAL among those nine states.
H0: Drug poisoning deaths after 5 years >= drug poisoning deaths before 5 years
HA: Drug poisoning deaths after 5 years < drug poisoning deaths before 5 years
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The model explores the relationship between counts of age-adjusted deaths (dependent
variable) and covariates, including Sex, Age Group, State, Year (as a class variable), MAL (5
years before and 5 years after), and interaction terms between Sex and Age Group, State and
MAL, Sex and MAL, and Age Group and MAL. An offset on population was included in the
model to treat population changes as a rate.
The theory supporting the interaction between Sex and Age Group is that males and
females probably have drug poisoning deaths that differ at different age ranges. The theory
supporting the interaction between State and MAL is that differences may exist between states
and their respective MALs as they relate to drug poisoning deaths. The theory supporting the
interaction between Sex and MAL is that male and females within the same age-group may
respond differently to the presence or absence of a MAL.

The theory supporting the interaction

between Age Group and MAL is that people of different age groups may respond differently to
the presence or absence of a MAL. Calculations were preformed using SAS 9.4.
In assessing the goodness of fit of the model, the scaled deviance and scaled Pearson chisquare statistics are considered. Values closer to one (1) signify a better model.

Here, the

scaled deviance value is 0.9850, indicating a good fit. (Hayat & Higgins, 2014) The lower-isbest AIC value (9070.7235) is lower than all other models tested, further signifying a good fit to
the data. Results displayed in Appendix, Figure 6.
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As shown by the summary statistics in the Appendix, Figure 7, all variables and
interaction terms are significant predictors in the model. Full results for the model are shown in
the Appendix, Figure 8.

Discussion
MALs are designed to help decrease, not increase, drug poisoning deaths by encouraging
calls for professional assistance during overdose events. Rather, this research suggests that
MALs might have largely failed to carry the intended effect, or that other factors have
overpowered any effect that MALs have carried. Indeed, state legislatures may enact MALs
because of growing drug poisoning deaths brought about by extraneous factors. The positive
association between a MAL and increasing drug poisoning deaths is likely an artifact of other
factors that influence drug poisoning deaths.
Effect moderation

The following statistics are reproduced from the full results, shown in the Appendix, in
Figure 8:
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Wald ChiSquare
196.26

Pr>ChiSq

Females

Estimate Standard 95% Confidence
Error
Limits
-0.4903 0.0350
-0.5589
-0.4217

Males

0.0000

.

.

0.0000

0.0000
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0.0000

<.0001

Sex*MAL (Females/0)

0.1003

0.0264

0.0486

0.1520

14.47

0.0001

Sex*MAL (Females/1)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

.

.

Sex*MAL (Males/0)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

.

.

Sex*MAL (Males/1)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

.

.

These results suggest that, generally, females have lower drug poisoning deaths than
males. The interaction between Sex and MAL, suggests that MALs may have a protective effect
for females, but not for males. Other comparisons from the full results in the Appendix, Figure 8
seem evident: drug poisoning deaths vary among Age Group and also among States. The trend
of increasing drug poisoning deaths is reflected by different values of the variable Year. The
Sex by Age Group interaction demonstrates that females and males of different age groups carry
different drug poisoning death rates. Differences in interactions between State and MAL
indicate a moderation effect, such that the presence of a MAL carries a different effect among
the different states involved in this analysis. Interactions between Age Group and MAL indicate
that different age groups may respond differently to the presence or absence of a MAL.

Missing Data
Rhode Island was particularly impacted by missing data. Among females aged 30-34 and
40-44, data were missing for 8 out of 10 of the relevant years (2007 – 2011, 2013 – 2017).
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Among females aged 35-39, data were missing for 9 out of 10 years. Among females aged 4549 and 50-54, data were missing 2 out of 10 years. Among females aged 55-59, data were
missing for 5 out of the relevant 10 years. Male age ranges were remarkable more complete,
with the following results: 30-34 (missing 4 out of 10 years, 35-39 (missing 2 out of 10 years),
and 55-59 (missing 1 out of 10 years). These results are shown in the Appendix, Exhibit 5.

Washington is the only state of the four examined that has not had a significant increase,
or non-significant decrease or a non-significant indication of no change in drug-related poisoning
deaths within the 5 years following passage of a Medical Amnesty Law. A closer look reveals
that no significant change occurred between the two five-year spans for each of the following
age groups: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 45-49, and 50-54. Missing data for age groups 65 and
older hampers continuing this analysis for these important age groups.

Comparison of MAL features among the nine states

Washington outperforms the other states concerning drug poisoning deaths. Could this
distinction be explained by differences in legal language among MALs in the nine states? Is it
possible that Washington’s MAL is different enough from MALs in the other states that
overdose victims and witnesses are more likely to contact authorities during overdose events?
Using the rubric described in the first paper in this dissertation, common features among MALs
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in the four states are compared (See Appendix, Figures 9a and 9b, for Features of Medical
Amnesty Laws from Nine States).
Essentially, no significant differences exist among the nine states in who receives
immunity from prosecution under the respective Medical Amnesty Laws. In Colorado,
Connecticut, New York, and Rhode Island, both drug or alcohol overdoses are included in
statutory provisions, while only drug overdoses are contemplated in Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Mexico and Washington. Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and Rhode
Island allow for immunity concerning drug paraphernalia charges, and in none of the nine states
will immunity provisions be granted for civil asset forfeiture proceedings. In all states but Rhode
Island, no immunity provision exists for those on court supervision, such as probation or parole.
Thus, no state stands apart from the others in terms of legal protections on these characteristics,
except for Rhode Island’s grant of immunity for those on court supervision. This provision
should tend to have more of an encouraging effect on witnesses to overdose to contact
authorities. See Appendix, Figure 9a.
No provisions exist to allow the use of evidence of overdose as mitigation at a sentencing
hearing if full amnesty is not granted among the nine states, except for Massachusetts, New
Mexico, and Rhode Island. All nine states require evidence from the overdose event to exist for
immunity to be provided. None of the four states convey immunity for distribution crimes
related to drugs or alcohol, except for Colorado (drug only) and New York. Only Colorado
imposes specific requirements to receive immunity, such as providing a name or other
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identifying information to a police officer on scene. Only Colorado, Illinois, and New York
provide a definition of “overdose” within the statutory language of its Medical Amnesty Law.
MALs from all nine states except Florida, Illinois, and Rhode Island make references to other
statutes. In short, no significant differences in statutory language among MALs from the nine
states examined seem to provide adequate explanation for Washington’s lack of a significant
increase in drug poisoning deaths. See Appendix, Figure 9b.
Perhaps citizens of Washington are more aware of that state’s MAL, understand the
parameters of legal protections against prosecution, and thus are more inclined to contact
authorities during overdose events. According to the University of Washington, Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Institute, Washington held a press conference when their “Good Samaritan Law”
took effect. Thereafter, radio public service announcements included messages from the state’s
Attorney General, the medical director of the Washington Poison Center, and the parent of a
teen-ager who died of an opiate overdose. References are made to the educational website
http://stopoverdose.org, explaining the law. Informational wallet cards have been distributed at
needle exchange programs and at other venues, and posters have been displayed about the law at
drug treatment programs. Links to the website have also been included on other websites and on
educational materials such as those distributed with opiate prescriptions. Ongoing media reports
of drug overdoses occasionally refer to the website. Whether these efforts are significantly
different from strategies in other states could be the subject of future study.
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Limitations and Future Research
Because correlation does not mean causation, the significance of MAL as a predictor of
drug poisoning deaths in the regression model does not mean that medical amnesty laws have
exerted an effect of increasing drug poisoning deaths. In fact, drug poisoning rates might be
higher within any given state but for the medical amnesty laws that exist. Medical amnesty laws
may have carried the intended effect of encouraging bystanders to contact authorities during
overdose events. Many other factors play a part in statistics related to drug poisoning deaths that
the overall trends exhibited may simply outweigh any improvement effect on MALs. Many
potential variables likely affect drug poisoning deaths that could affect the results of this study or
nullify the effect of a MAL. This model is based upon drug poisoning deaths, while a more
direct measure of a MALs efficacy may include comparing yearly calls to 9-1-1 emergency
centers, or annual requests for assistance at hospital emergency departments. Qualitative studies
may help delineate the thought process of what occurs among those at or near the site of an
overdose. Further, the quantity of missing data available limits this study to the 30-59 age range.
Possibly, younger or older age groups may respond differently to the presence or absence of
MALs that the age groups studied here.

Conclusion
The association between the enactment of Medical Amnesty Laws and increasing or
decreasing drug poisoning deaths does not mean that such laws either caused or prevented such
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deaths. More investigation is warranted to explain these differences. This paper explored certain
distinguishing features in MALs among these nine states and how the enactment of policies and
informational campaigns in Washington may have led to greater success in combatting drug
poisoning deaths. Some limitations, however, may skew the data in favor of reporting overdose
deaths in more populous jurisdictions. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National
Centers for Injury Prevention and Control. (CDC). 2005) Importantly, this research is consistent
with other research that suggests that members of the population may be unaware of legislation
designed to encourage calls for professional assistance during overdose events.

Appendix – Chapter 3 – Comparison of Drug Poisoning Death Rates in Nine States with a
Medical Amnesty Law
Exhibit 1 - States with Medical Amnesty Laws enacted prior to 2012
State
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Massachusetts
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
Washington

Effective Date of MAL
Source: Rees, et al.
May 29, 2012
October 1, 2011
October 1, 2012
June 1, 2012
August 2, 2012
June 15, 2017
September 18, 2011
June 18, 2012
June 10, 2010
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Exhibit 2 - Drug Poisoning Rates for 2000 – 2017 for 9 states and the U.S.

United States
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Massachusetts
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
Washington

Drug Poisoning
Deaths 2000-2017
637,886
11,598
8,262
45,841
24,044
17,724
7,185
30,470
3,184
14,893

Population Total
for 2000-2017
3,272,940,342
54,950,592
38,031,828
194,403,714
137,012,529
71,972,414
20,864,629
211,904,756
11,463,902
72,583,457

Source: CDC – WISQARS, downloaded 3/2/19
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Crude Rate
19.49
21.11
21.72
23.58
17.55
24.63
34.44
14.38
27.77
20.52

Exhibit 3 - Comparison of Drug Poisoning Deaths for U.S. and Nine States for Age Ranges 2064, and Years 2000 - 2017

Source: CDC WISQARS, downloaded 3/2/19. All Intents, drug poisoning, 2007-2017, no metro indicator,
all races, both sexes, age groups 30-59, standard year: 2000.
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Exhibit 4 - Nationwide Non-fatal Drug Poisoning Rates per 100,000 – 2007 to 2017
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Exhibit 5 – Missing Data for States Examined

CONNECTICUT
MAL year: 2011
Years examined:

2006-2010/2012-2016

Connecticut
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year
Females
30-34
2006, 2009,
2010
Females
Females

NEW MEXICO
MAL year: 2007
Years examined:

35-39
55-59

Percentage of total population missing for
indicated year for ages 30-59
2006: 105,250/780,869 = 0.135
2009: 103,752/772,284 = 0.134
2010: 104,194/770,777 = 0.135
2006: 129,584/780,869 = 0.166
2006: 117,843/780,869 =0.151
2007: 115,579/774,753 = 0.149

2006
2006, 2007

2002-2006/2008-2012

New Mexico
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year
Females
30-34
2002
Females
35-39
2007
Females
45-49
2002
Females
50-54
2002
Males
55-59
2002
Females
55-59
2002, 2003,
2005

Percentage of total population missing for
indicated year for ages 30-59
2002: 59,123/381,770 = 0.155
2007: 62,626/402,612 = 0.156
2002: 70,018/381,770 = 0.183
2002: 63,464/381,770 = 0.166
2002: 47,949/367,805 = 0.130
2002: 50,849/381,770 = 0.133
2003: 53,746/384,992 = 0.139
2005: 60,828/394,094 = 0.154
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RHODE ISLAND
MAL year: 2012
Years examined:

2007-2011/2013-2017

Rhode Island
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year
Females
30-34
2007, 2008,
2009, 2010,
2013, 2014,
2015, 2016
Females
35-39
2007, 2008,
2009, 2010,
2011, 2013,
2014, 2015,
2016
Females
40-44
2007, 2009,
2010, 2011,
2013, 2014,
2015, 2016
Females
45-49
2007, 2015
Females
50-54
2007, 2014
Females
55-59
2007, 2008,
2009, 2010,
2011
Males
30-34
2007, 2009,
2010, 2011
Males
35-39
2009, 2011
Males
55-59
2007

NEW YORK
MAL year: 2011
Years examined:

Percentage of total population missing for
indicated year for ages 30-59
MISSING 8 OUT OF 10 YEARS

MISSING 9 OUT OF 10 YEARS

MISSING 8 OUT OF 10 YEARS

MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS
MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS
MISSING 5 OUT OF 10 YEARS

MISSING 4 OUT OF 10 YEARS
MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS
MISSING 1 OUT OF 10 YEARS

2006-2010/2012-2016

NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES
AND FEMALES
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WASHINGTON
MAL year: 2010
Years examined:

2005-2009/2011-2015

NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES
AND FEMALES
COLORADO, FLORIDA, ILLINOIS, MASSACHUSETTS
MAL year: 2012
Years examined:
2007-2011/2013-2017
NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES
AND FEMALES
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Graph 1 - Colorado

99

Graph 2 – Connecticut

100

Graph 3 – Florida

101

Graph 4 – Illinois

102

Graph 5 – Massachusetts

103

Graph 6 – New Mexico

104

Graph 7 – New York

105

Graph 8 – Rhode Island

Note missing data limitation
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Graph 9 – Washington
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Figure 1 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in Connecticut
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Figure 2 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in New Mexico
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Figure 3 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in New York and Washington
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Figure 4 – Distribution of Drug Poisoning Deaths for Nine states show a Poisson distribution
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Figure 5 – Probability Plot of Drug Poisoning Deaths for Nine states show a Poisson Distribution

Figure 6 - Criteria for Assessing Goodness of Fit
Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion

DF

Value Value/DF

Deviance

975 2950.3141

3.0260

Scaled Deviance

975

960.3615

0.9850

Pearson Chi-Square

975 2995.2848

3.0721

Scaled Pearson X2

975

1.0000

975.0000

Log Likelihood

95626.7778

Full Log Likelihood

-4485.3618
9070.7235

AIC (smaller is better)
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit
Criterion

DF

Value Value/DF

AICC (smaller is better)

9075.9597

BIC (smaller is better)

9317.3459

Figure 7 - Summary Statistics for Model
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source

Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq

Sex

1

990 1307.72 <.0001

1307.72

<.0001

Age_Group

5

990

27.83 <.0001

139.16

<.0001

State

8

990

92.18 <.0001

737.42

<.0001

MAL

1

990

193.04 <.0001

193.04

<.0001

State*MAL

8

990

21.63 <.0001

173.03

<.0001

Sex*MAL

1

990

8.47 0.0037

8.47

0.0036

Age_Group*MAL

5

990

14.43 <.0001

72.16

<.0001

Sex*Age_Group

5

990

18.24 <.0001

91.19

<.0001

Figure 8 – Full Statistics for Model
Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter

DF Estimate Standard
Error

Intercept

Wald 95%
Confidence
Limits

Wald Pr > ChiSq
ChiSquare

1

-7.6845

0.0471 -7.7768 -7.5922 26614.1

<.0001

0.0350 -0.5589 -0.4217 196.26

<.0001

Sex

Females

1

-0.4903

Sex

Males

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group

30-34 yrs

1

0.2904

0.0327 0.2262 0.3545

78.75

<.0001

Age_Group

35-39 yrs

1

0.2315

0.0335 0.1659 0.2972

47.75

<.0001

Age_Group

40-44 yrs

1

0.1223

0.0340 0.0556 0.1890

12.92

0.0003
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter

DF Estimate Standard
Error

Wald 95%
Confidence
Limits

Wald Pr > ChiSq
ChiSquare

Age_Group

45-49 yrs

1

0.1661

0.0331 0.1013 0.2309

25.25

<.0001

Age_Group

50-54 yrs

1

0.1345

0.0330 0.0698 0.1992

16.62

<.0001

Age_Group

55-59 yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State

Colorado

1

-0.1306

0.0467 -0.2221 -0.0391

7.82

0.0052

State

Conn

1

0.1804

0.0483 0.0859 0.2750

13.98

0.0002

State

Florida

1

0.0395

0.0378 -0.0345 0.1135

1.09

0.2956

State

Illinois

1

-0.1060

0.0401 -0.1845 -0.0274

7.00

0.0082

State

Massachusetts

1

0.3416

0.0412 0.2609 0.4223

68.87

<.0001

State

Nmex

1

0.6222

0.0656 0.4935 0.7508

89.88

<.0001

State

Nyork

1

-0.2217

0.0375 -0.2951 -0.1483

35.04

<.0001

State

Rhode Island

1

0.5463

0.0660 0.4170 0.6757

68.52

<.0001

State

Wash

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Year

2002

1

-0.5749

0.1720 -0.9120 -0.2378

11.17

0.0008

Year

2003

1

-0.6331

0.1534 -0.9337 -0.3326

17.05

<.0001

Year

2004

1

-0.7527

0.1559 -1.0582 -0.4472

23.31

<.0001

Year

2005

1

-0.5690

0.0986 -0.7623 -0.3757

33.30

<.0001

Year

2006

1

-0.5174

0.0821 -0.6783 -0.3565

39.73

<.0001

Year

2007

1

-0.5416

0.0740 -0.6866 -0.3966

53.61

<.0001

Year

2008

1

-0.5293

0.0732 -0.6727 -0.3859

52.33

<.0001

Year

2009

1

-0.5324

0.0732 -0.6759 -0.3890

52.92

<.0001

Year

2010

1

-0.5943

0.0736 -0.7385 -0.4501

65.24

<.0001

Year

2011

1

-0.5043

0.0678 -0.6371 -0.3714

55.35

<.0001

Year

2012

1

-0.5940

0.0442 -0.6807 -0.5073 180.27

<.0001

Year

2013

1

-0.5562

0.0296 -0.6142 -0.4982 353.44

<.0001

Year

2014

1

-0.5084

0.0292 -0.5657 -0.4511 302.38

<.0001

Year

2015

1

-0.3504

0.0282 -0.4056 -0.2952 154.86

<.0001
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter

DF Estimate Standard
Error

Wald 95%
Confidence
Limits

Wald Pr > ChiSq
ChiSquare

Year

2016

1

-0.0693

0.0268 -0.1218 -0.0168

6.69

0.0097

Year

2017

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

MAL

0

1

-0.0950

0.0784 -0.2488 0.0587

1.47

0.2256

MAL

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Females

3034
yrs

1

-0.4548

0.0484 -0.5498 -0.3599

88.15

<.0001

Sex*Age_Group

Females

3539
yrs

1

-0.3007

0.0478 -0.3944 -0.2071

39.61

<.0001

Sex*Age_Group

Females

4044
yrs

1

-0.1831

0.0465 -0.2743 -0.0919

15.48

<.0001

Sex*Age_Group

Females

4549
yrs

1

-0.0637

0.0445 -0.1508 0.0235

2.05

0.1521

Sex*Age_Group

Females

5054
yrs

1

-0.0064

0.0446 -0.0938 0.0811

0.02

0.8864

Sex*Age_Group

Females

5559
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Males

3034
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Males

3539
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Males

4044
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter

DF Estimate Standard
Error

Wald 95%
Confidence
Limits

Wald Pr > ChiSq
ChiSquare

Sex*Age_Group

Males

4549
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Males

5054
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*Age_Group

Males

5559
yrs

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Colorado

0

1

0.1100

0.0675 -0.0222 0.2422

2.66

0.1031

State*MAL

Colorado

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Conn

0

1

-0.4786

0.0749 -0.6253 -0.3318

40.84

<.0001

State*MAL

Conn

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Florida

0

1

0.0455

0.0542 -0.0608 0.1518

0.70

0.4017

State*MAL

Florida

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Illinois

0

1

-0.2701

0.0590 -0.3858 -0.1543

20.92

<.0001

State*MAL

Illinois

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Massachusetts 0

1

-0.4987

0.0627 -0.6216 -0.3758

63.26

<.0001

State*MAL

Massachusetts 1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Nmex

0

1

-0.1714

0.1044 -0.3760 0.0331

2.70

0.1005

State*MAL

Nmex

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Nyork

0

1

-0.3088

0.0544 -0.4154 -0.2023

32.26

<.0001

State*MAL

Nyork

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Rhode Island 0

1

-0.2846

0.1093 -0.4988 -0.0704

6.78

0.0092

State*MAL

Rhode Island 1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Wash

0

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

State*MAL

Wash

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*MAL

Females

0

1

0.1003

0.0264 0.0486 0.1520

14.47

0.0001
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter

DF Estimate Standard
Error

Wald 95%
Confidence
Limits

Wald Pr > ChiSq
ChiSquare

Sex*MAL

Females

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*MAL

Males

0

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Sex*MAL

Males

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 30-34 yrs

0

1

-0.0358

0.0478 -0.1294 0.0578

0.56

0.4532

Age_Group*MAL 30-34 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 35-39 yrs

0

1

0.0060

0.0473 -0.0868 0.0988

0.02

0.8989

Age_Group*MAL 35-39 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 40-44 yrs

0

1

0.2620

0.0461 0.1716 0.3523

32.30

<.0001

Age_Group*MAL 40-44 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 45-49 yrs

0

1

0.2929

0.0445 0.2058 0.3801

43.39

<.0001

Age_Group*MAL 45-49 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 50-54 yrs

0

1

0.2119

0.0450 0.1237 0.3000

22.20

<.0001

Age_Group*MAL 50-54 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 55-59 yrs

0

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

Age_Group*MAL 55-59 yrs

1

0

0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

.

.

0

1.7527

0.0000 1.7527 1.7527

Scale
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Figure 9a - Features of Medical Amnesty Laws from Nine States – Part 1
STATE

STATUTE

Receiver of
Immunity

Overdose
Substance

Immunity
provision
regarding
paraphernalia
charges?

Immunity
provision
regarding
civil asset
forfeiture?

Colorado

18-1-711 (2018)

caller and OD victim

yes

no

Connecticut

21a-267 (2017)

caller and OD victim

yes

no

no

21a-279 (2017)

caller and OD victim

no

no

no

no
no

no
no

no
no

caller and OD victim

either drugs or
alcohol
either drugs or
alcohol
either drugs or
alcohol
drugs
specific
drug/combination
drugs

Immunity
provision
regarding
Probation
or parole
violation?
no

no

no

no

caller and OD victim

drugs

no

no

no

caller and OD victim

drugs

no

no

no

caller and OD victim

either drugs or
alcohol
either drugs or
alcohol
either drugs or
alcohol
drugs

yes

no

no

no

no

no

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

Florida
Illinois

893.21 (2018)
720 ILCS 646/115
(2018)
720 ILCS 570/414
(2018)
Massachusetts Ch94C, Section
34A (2017)
New Mexico
30-31-27.1
(2018)
New York
220.78 (2018)

caller and OD victim
caller and OD victim

220.03 (2018)

caller

Rhode Island

21-28.8-4 (2018)

caller and OD victim

Washington

69.50.315 (2018)

caller and OD victim
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Figure 9b - Features of Medical Amnesty Laws from Nine States – Part 2
STATE

Colorado
Connecticut

Florida
Illinois

Massachusetts

STATUTE

Is mitigation
possible if
full amnesty
is not
granted?

18-1-711
(2018)
21a-267
(2017)
21a-279
(2017)
893.21
(2018)
720 ILCS
646/115
(2018)
720 ILCS
570/414
(2018)
Ch94C,
Section 34A
(2017)

no provision

New Mexico

30-31-27.1
(2018)

New York

220.78
(2018)
220.03
(2018)
21-28.8-4
(2018)

Rhode
Island

Washington

69.50.315
(2018)

Does
Immunity
require
evidence
from OD
event?
yes

Immunity for
certain
distribution
crimes?

Overdose
Definition
Provided?

Number of
other
statutes
referenced

drug only

Specific
requirem
ents to
receive
immunity
?
yes

yes

6

no provision

yes

no

no

no

2

no provision

yes

no

no

no

2

no provision

yes

no

no

no

0

no provision

yes

no

no

yes

0

no provision

yes

no

no

yes

0

mitigation
for drug, not
alcohol
offenses
mitigation
for drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision

yes

no

no

no

3

yes

no

no

no

1

yes

yes

no

yes

5

no provision

yes

no

no

no

2

mitigation
for drug, not
alcohol
offenses
no provision

yes

no

no

no

0

yes

no

no

no

2
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CHAPTER 4 - PRACTICAL BARRIERS TO OBTAINING NALOXONE IN GEORGIA

Study Title: Barriers for Laypersons Wanting to Purchase Narcan® in Georgia

Abstract
BACKGROUND: In Georgia, various legal measures have been enacted to make naloxone
products like Narcan® more accessible to laypersons to combat the wave of opioid-related
overdose deaths. Now, laypersons may legally purchase naloxone products without a
prescription for use during opioid-related overdose events. This study sought to identify
common barriers that still exist for the purchase of Narcan®, a nasally-administered form of
naloxone.
METHODS: A randomized telephone survey of pharmacies was conducted in select counties
with high drug poisoning deaths by volume and high overdose death rates compared to controls
within the State of Georgia. Variables of interest included the current price, availability, and
required documentation for purchase.
RESULTS: Slightly more than one-half of pharmacy representatives contacted stated they had
Narcan® in stock at the time of contact. Prices for Narcan® ranged from $65.00 to $201.00.
Approximately one-half of the pharmacy representatives questioned stated that a physician’s
prescription was required to purchase Narcan®, despite a Standing Order and a change in
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Georgia law that removed this formerly mandated requirement. Of representatives who stated
that a prescription was not necessary, more than two-thirds described specific requirements for
purchase of naloxone, such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the
potential overdose victim.
CONCLUSIONS: In Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of Narcan® exist, making it less
likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will obtain the
product. An informational intervention is recommended.
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Background
Reports of the nation’s current drug overdose crisis are ubiquitous, although some states
fare better than others. For instance, from 2008 – 2014, Georgia’s annualized, age-adjusted
poisoning death rate for all ages (11.82/100,000) is substantially less that the nationwide rate
(14.45/100,000). ii Like many states, however, Georgia’s drug overdose death rates have risen
each year. From 2010 to 2017, Georgia’s overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while
the population increased 7.6%.

iii

The characteristics of Georgia’s drug overdose deaths have

also changed. The percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths increased
from 40.1% in 2010 to 64.4% in 2017. See Appendix Table 1. Drug poisoning deaths are also
distributed unevenly across Georgia: out of 159 counties, 42 reported higher poisoning death
rates than the national average during 2008 - 2014. Georgia’s most populous 20 counties
account for more than 50% of all statewide drug poisoning deaths.

iv

Understanding factors related to the distribution of drug overdose deaths in Georgia and
elsewhere may help policymakers focus efforts on interventions that do the most good. One
strategy that has received wide support is to make naloxone products like Narcan®, an opioid
antagonist drug, more available to those who may witness an overdose or come into contact with
overdose victims. The United States Surgeon General supports such a measure v as does the
Georgia Department of Public Health (GADPH). For example, the GADPH provides
information on its webpage concerning “Emergency Help for Opioid Overdoses” with
information on “Signs of Opioid Overdose”, and “How to Administer Naloxone”. The website
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also details how to use different Naloxone products, such as Narcan® and Evzio®, and how to
recognize withdrawal symptoms.vi The value of bystanders having access to naloxone has also
been reported in the academic literature. (Davis, Webb, & Burris, 2013)
Georgia policymakers have acted to remove previous barriers to laypersons acquiring
Naloxone. On January 12, 2017, Brenda C. Fitzgerald, Commissioner of Public Health and State
Health Officer of the Georgia Department of Public Health, authorized the execution of a
Standing Order that serves as a prescription for laypersons to obtain Naloxone from a licensed
pharmacy. The policy goal behind the Standing Order is stated clearly:
“The purpose of this Standing Order is to facilitate the widest possible availability of
Naloxone among the residents of this State, in order to ensure that family members,
friends, co-workers, first responders, schools, pain management clinics, harm reduction
organizations, and any other persons or entities (Eligible Persons or Entities) are in a
position to provide assistance to person[s] experiencing an opioid-related overdose
through the timely administration of the opioid antagonist Naloxone.”

The Georgia General Assembly demonstrated its support of the Department of Public
Health’s Standing Order by enacting O.C.G.A. § 26-4-116.2 (f), which requires that “Every
pharmacy in this state shall retain a copy of the standing order issued under Code Section 31-110” (Effective July 1, 2017). Lawmakers also amended Georgia’s Dangerous Drug Act (effective
July 1, 2017) to exempt Naloxone from the list of drugs that require a physician’s prescription, if
the Naloxone is used for drug overdose prevention and supplied by a dispenser in a specified
manner. vii Thus, at the time of this study, Georgia pharmacists have authority that allows the
dispensation of Naloxone products without a prescription from a physician.
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Determining whether barriers continue to exist for those who wish to purchase naloxone
may inform policymakers and assist in allocating resources for the best measures in combatting
the opioid overdose crisis, designing more effective public service announcements, and adopting
measures necessary to implement existing law. Cressman, and others studied whether members
of the Canadian public continued to have difficulty procuring naloxone despite legislation that
made naloxone available without prescription. (Cressman et al., 2017) Those researchers
utilized a cross-sectional study of Canadian pharmacists and found that only 24% had naloxone
available and that availability varied significantly by region. Further, nearly 1 in 7 pharmacists
incorrectly stated that a prescription was required or were uncertain about whether one was
required. That research also reported that of those pharmacies with naloxone available when
contacted, nearly half charged a fee, ranging from $25 to $200 (median cost was $50.00).
This study sought to identify common barriers that still exist for the purchase of
Naloxone products in Georgia. We focused on Narcan®, a form of Naloxone that is
administered intra-nasally and requires little training for its use, because we believe that most
laypersons would prefer this form to injectable forms of Naloxone, and would be more likely to
seek this nasal-spray form from a pharmacy. viii At least one study supports this view, ix plus the
Georgia Department of Public Health encourages Georgians to purchase Narcan® through its
website tagline, “Love an Addict? Carry Narcan.” x The lower price of Narcan® also makes it a
more realistic product for the study of barriers to laypersons in purchasing Naloxone; Evzio®, an
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auto-injectable brand described on the GADPH website, may cost several thousand dollars and
thus be unaffordable for many. xi

Methodology
Comparison between Georgia and nationwide drug poisoning deaths in 2016

Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web-based Injury Statistics Query
and Reporting System (WISQARS) systemxii, we generated fatal injury reports data that showed
that in 2016 Georgia suffered 13.28/100,000 drug poisoning deaths, compared with
19.73/100,000 nationwide.

xiii

Georgia’s metro areas suffered drug poisoning deaths of

13.48/100,000 versus 12.32/100,000 for non-metro areas in the state. xiv Georgia’s metro areas
comprise approximately 83% of the state’s total population. Thus, exploring any existing
differences in these more populous areas may prove helpful in addressing drug poisoning deaths.
However, county-level data is not available from this CDC data base outside the years 2008 –
2014.

County-level data in Georgia to compare with nationwide drug poisoning deaths

Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web-based Injury Statistics Query
and Reporting System (WISQARS) system, Fatal Injury Data, Fatal Injury Maps 2008-2014, an
age-adjusted map (2000 as the standard year) of poisoning deaths in Georgia at the county level
was generated. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Centers for Injury
125

Prevention and Control, 2005) The available data does not delineate between drug poisoning
deaths and other types of poisoning deaths, such as from unintentional exposure to toxic
chemicals. The annualized, age-adjusted poisoning death rate for Georgia was 11.82/100,000
poisoning deaths for all ages, compared with a nationwide annualized, age-adjusted rate of
14.45/100,000 for all ages, during 2008 – 2014.
Georgia has 159 counties. Of note, WISQARS only provides drug poisoning data for 76
counties. Drug poisoning death data for the remaining 83 Georgia counties may be missing
because of a data suppression rule that provides that no figure, including totals, less than 10 in
tabulations for sub-national geographic areas, regardless of the number of years combined with
the data from 2008 and later.
Although Georgia exhibited a lower annualized, age-adjusted poisoning death rate for
2008-2014 than the nationwide average, 42 Georgia counties reported higher poisoning death
rates than the nationwide average. Some Georgia counties, although not having death rates that
exceeded the national average, contributed a large volume of poisoning deaths to the total
number of deaths; twenty (20) counties had more than 100 total annual deaths on average for the
time period 2008-2014.
The focus of the study is on contacting pharmacies in county seats of those counties with
poisoning deaths rates that exceed the nationwide average of 14.45/100,000 from 2008 – 2014
(“high death rate counties”, n=42), and with more than 100 total annual deaths on average for the
same period (“high death volume counties”, n=20). Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd,
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and Richmond Counties (n=6) fit into both the high death rate and the high death volume
categories. These 6 counties are included in the high death volume county list, but omitted from
the high death rate county list to explore possible differences in drug poisoning deaths between
metro and non-metro areas in Georgia. Thus, 56 counties (“eligible counties”) fit either the high
death rate county category, the high death volume category, or both. Pharmacies from the
remaining 20 counties in Georgia for which drug poisoning death data are available were
randomly surveyed to acquire comparison statistics for the state.
A list of pharmacies that service each county seat (largest city in each county) was
obtained from Superpages.com, an online telephone and address directory which can be searched
to provide pharmacy contact information by city. (superpages.com, n.d.)

Each pharmacy was

numbered, and a random sequence generator used to select pharmacies for contact. The question
sequence was begun with the pharmacy representative who first answered the phone, and
continued with subsequent representatives if the first respondent passed the call.
Anticipated Complications

Certain anticipated complications were addressed as follows:
1. Pharmacies were included in the sampling frame only if they are located in Georgia. It is
unrealistic to expect pharmacists in adjoining states to be responsible for adhering to
requirements for obtaining naloxone in Georgia. For example, Fannin County borders
Tennessee, yet fewer than half of the 137 pharmacies listed by Superpages.com that
provide service to Blue Ridge, Georgia, (the county seat for Fannin County) are located
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in Georgia. Instead, the majority of pharmacies listed are located in nearby Chattanooga,
Tennessee. We recognize that Blue Ridge residents may be willing to travel to
Tennessee to obtain naloxone. However, expanding the survey to include pharmacies in
other states would likely inject weaknesses into the study. Georgia is surrounded by
Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, and dispensing
requirements and pharmacy training may differ widely among these states. Expanding
the research to include pharmacies in these other states may result in the tabulation of
dispensing requirements and policies irrelevant to the study.
2. Some pharmacies appear on more than county’s list because some county seats are
located close together. The final lists for inclusion in this study omitted any repetition,
such that each pharmacy location was listed once in the sampling frame and was
available for random selection only one time. For example, the cities of Toccoa
(Stephens County) and Carnesville (Franklin County) are located approximately twenty
miles apart. Some pharmacies are listed on both the Toccoa (Stephens County) and
Carnesville (Franklin County) lists. Such pharmacies were included only one time in the
sampling frame to ensure that each pharmacy had an equal probability for random
selection. This process is further supported by the belief that many people would be
willing to travel to a nearby city to obtain important medication. To further guard against
multiple calls to the same pharmacy, the last 4 digits of phone numbers contacted were
recorded in a database and then used to verify that new call attempts were unique.
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3. The pharmacy directory service to be used, Superpages.com, often provides directory
listings for individual pharmacy personnel in addition to pharmacy businesses. Personnel
listings were excluded, so that the final sampling frame included only pharmacy
businesses that would likely be contacted by prospective customers for pricing,
availability, and other purchase requirements concerning Narcan®.

4. To avoid influencing the results of each call through the display of caller-identifying
information, the lead author’s personal cell phone was used to make all calls to
pharmacies rather than phones traceable to organizations through which the authors are
affiliated, such as Georgia State University or the lead author’s law firm.

From the sampling frame compiled, a total of 120 pharmacies were randomly selected without
replacement and contacted by telephone during a two month period in Fall, 2018 as follows:

1) High death rate counties (poisoning death rate exceeding 14.45/100,000) - 40
pharmacies randomly selected without replacement (36 counties– 588 pharmacies).

2) High death volume counties (more than 100 deaths from 2008 - 2014), 40 pharmacies
randomly selected without replacement. (20 counties – 843 pharmacies). As noted
elsewhere, 6 counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd, and Richmond)
qualify as either high death rate or high death volume counties. These 6 counties are
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included in the high death volume county list, but omitted from the high death rate county
list.
3) Comparison counties (neither high death rate nor high death volume), 40 pharmacies
randomly selected to provide baseline data (20 counties - 335 pharmacies).

We systematically contacted pharmacies in Georgia and asked pharmacy representatives a series
of questions to test the following four (4) potential barriers to the acquisition of Narcan®:
•

Availability of Narcan®: Do you have Narcan® nasal spray in stock?

•

Price of Narcan®: How much does it cost?

•

Awareness that Narcan® does not require a prescription: Can I buy it without a
prescription?

•

Other barriers: Are there any forms I have to fill out if I want to pay with cash?

The Georgia State University Institutional Review Board designated this study as not Human
Subject Research, therefore it was exempt from review.
Results
Pharmacy representatives in all 120 pharmacies contacted provided responses for the
survey. The 120 pharmacies contacted constitute 6.8% of the total number of pharmacies
(1,766) eligible for the study.
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Whether Narcan® in stock and its price
Of the pharmacy representatives questioned in High Rate counties, 55% stated that they
had Narcan® in stock at the time of contact, compared with 64% of High Volume counties and
62.5% of Comparison counties. The average price for Narcan® in High Rate counties was
$128.17 (Range: 71.69 to 180.00), compared with $133.40 (Range: 71.69 to 171.95) in High
Volume counties, and$128.11 (Range: 65.00 to 201.00) in Comparison counties. Prices of
Narcan® in High Rate counties did not differ significantly from prices in Comparison counties
(p = 0.99, alpha = 0.05). Prices of Narcan® in High Volume counties did not differ significantly
from prices in Comparison counties (p=0.46, alpha = 0.05) Similarly, prices of Narcan® did not
differ significantly between High Rate and High Volume counties. (p = 0.22, alpha = 0.05)
Because one pharmacy representative in one High Volume county refused to answer
whether Narcan® was in stock, this response was removed from the database for the purpose of
determining whether county category and stock percentage were statistically independent. A
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis that county category is
statistically independent from having Narcan® in stock (p= 0.6753). Therefore, there is not a
significant difference among High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison counties in the price or
availability of Narcan® among the pharmacies contacted, as presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Results among Georgia counties by category: availability and price of Narcan®
Percentage in Average Price
Difference in price
stock
(low – high)
from Comparison
Counties (p-value)*
High Rate
55% (22/40)
128.17
$0.06 (p=0.99)
Counties
(71.69 – 180.00)
N=40
High Volume 64% (25/39)
133.40
$5.29 (p=0.46)
Counties
(1 no answer) (71.69 – 171.05)
N=40
Comparison
62.5% (25/40) 128.11
Counties
(65.00 – 201.00)
N=40
Total
60.5%
*2-tailed, two-sample T-test with equal variance (homoscedastic)
Requirements to purchase Narcan®
Slightly more than half the pharmacy representatives questioned in High Rate counties
(51.3%) and High Volume counties (55%) stated that a physician’s prescription was not required
for purchase of Narcan®, compared with 48.6% of those in Comparison counties. Of those who
stated that a prescription was not required, most described specific requirements for purchase of
naloxone, such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the potential
overdose victim or the need to see identification such as a driver’s license and the need for a
name and address from the purchaser (Table 2).
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Table 2: Results among Georgia counties by category: Whether prescription required and
additional requirements for purchase of Narcan®
Accurate Requirement
No additional requirements for
(n/%)Prescription correct purchase (among those
answering prescription question
correctly)
High Rate
51.3%
37% (7/19)
Counties
(20/39 – 1 no answer)
High Volume
Counties
Comparison
Counties
Total

55.9%
(19/34 – 6 no answer)
48.6% (18/37 – 3 no
answer)
51.8% (57/110 – 10 no
answer)

68% (13/19)
33% (5/15)
47% (25/53)

Because several pharmacy representatives refused to answer whether a prescription was
required to purchase Narcan®, those responses were removed from the database for the purpose
of determining whether county category and correct answers were statistically independent. A
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis that county category is
statistically independent from answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for
purchasing Narcan® (p= 0.8748). Therefore, there is no significant difference among
pharmacies contacted in High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison counties in answering
correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for purchasing Narcan®.
Among those who answered that a doctor’s prescription was not required to purchase
Narcan®, more than half either refused to answer or did not know whether additional
requirements existed to purchase Narcan®. These responses were removed from the database
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for the purpose of determining whether county category and additional requirements were
statistically independent. A Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis
that county category is statistically independent from imposing additional requirements for
purchasing Narcan® (n = 53, p= 0.0669, alpha = 0.05). Therefore, the evidence suggests no
significant difference among pharmacies contacted in High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison
counties in imposing additional requirements for purchasing Narcan®.
The six counties that could be categorized as either High Volume or High Rate counties

Of the 6 counties that could be included in either the high rate or high volume categories,
a total of 157 pharmacies were listed in respective county seats. Ten (10) pharmacies from these
counties were among those randomly contacted. We present the following summary statistics
from these 6 counties in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary of results for 6 Georgia counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield,
Floyd, and Richmond) that qualify as either “high rate” or “high volume” counties

6 special
counties

Narcan® in
Stock

Average Price
(low – high)

Prescription
not required
for purchase

5/9; 1 N/A
55.5%

139.57
(129.99 – 150.00)

6/9 = 66.7%
1 NA
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Additional
requirements for
purchase (among
those answering
prescription
question
correctly)
3/4
(2 no answer)

Additional
requirements for
purchase

75%

A comparison of features of the “6 special” counties with features of other county categories, the
“6 special” counties are more similar to High Volume counties (the category in which they were
assigned) in price and requirements for purchasing Narcan® than with either High Rate or
Comparison Counties. This supports the inclusion of these “6 special” counties within the High
Volume county category rather than the High Rate county category. However, there was a
significant price difference between the “6 special” counties and other High Rate counties
(p=0.033) and with other High Volume counties (p=0.043). See Table 4.

Table 4: Summary of Results among all Georgia counties by category
Narcan® in Average Price
Price
Prescription
Stock
(low – high)
difference
not required
from Special for purchase
6 counties
of Narcan®

High Rate
counties

55%

(11.40)**
p=0.033

128.17
(71.69 – 180.00)

51.3%

Additional
requirements for
purchase of
Narcan® (among
those answering
prescription
question correctly)
66.7%
(12/18 - 2 no
answer)
77.7% (14/18 - 1 no
answer)

High Volume 64%
(7.97)
55.9%
131.60
counties (w/
(71.69 – 171.05)
p=0.11
6 Special
counties
removed)
Comparison
62.5%
(11.46)**
48.6%
75% (12/16 - 2 no
128.11
counties
(65.00 – 201.00)
p=0.043
answer)
6 Special
5/9; 1 N/A 139.57
6/9 = 66.7%
75% (3/4 - 2 no
Counties*
55.5%
(129.99 – 150.00)
1 NA
answer)
* Summary of sub-analysis for 6 Georgia counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd,
and Richmond) that qualify as either “high rate” or “high volume” counties
**Special 6 Counties vs. Comparison Counties: T-test p=0.043, one-tailed, unequal variance Ftest = 0.003
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Special 6 Counties vs. High Rate Counties: T-test p=0.033, one-tailed, unequal variance F-test =
0.007
Special 6 Counties vs. High Volume Counties: T-test p=0.11, one-tailed, unequal variance F-test
= 0.01
Chain store status as confounder
Additional analysis indicates that a potential confounder may be the influence of whether
pharmacies contacted were part of a widely recognized chain store brand. “Chain stores” are
defined in this work as widely recognized brands with more than 350 locations in the United
States. Actual chain store names are on file with the lead author and are available upon request.
More chain stores were represented among those pharmacies randomly selected than non-chain
stores. In High Rate counties, chain stores represented 52.5% (21 of 40), in High Volume
counties, chain stores represented 65% (26 of 40), and in Comparison counties, chain stores
represented 65% (26 of 40) of those pharmacies contacted.
The average price of Narcan® was consistently lower in chain stores than in non-chain
pharmacies across all county categories. In High Rate counties (overall average: $128.17), the
average chain store price was $116.18 (Range: $71.69 to $143.38), compared with the average
non-chain pharmacy price of $148.15 (Range: $85.00 to $180.00). In High Volume counties
(overall average: $133.40), the average chain store price was $128.22 (Range: $71.69 to
$171.95), compared with the average non-chain pharmacy price of $151.18 (Range: $145.00 to
$161.25). In Comparison counties (overall average: $128.11), the average chain store price was
$117.41 (Range: $65.00 to $171.95), compared with the average non-chain pharmacy price of
136

$150.50 (Range: $131.59 to $201.00). Differences between chain store pharmacies and nonchain store pharmacies were statistically significant across all categories, with chain store prices
being markedly lower. See Table 5.
Table 5: Price of Narcan® among Georgia pharmacies sampled
Chain Store
Non-chain Store

High Rate Counties

2323.61/20 = 116.18
1 no answer

1777.77/12= 148.15
7 no answer

(Low: 71.69; High:
143.38)
3077.18/24 = 128.22
2 no answer

(Low: 85.00; High:
180.00)
1058.25/7 = 151.18
7 no answer

(Low: 71.69; High:
171.95)
2700.35/23 = 117.41
3 no answer

(Low: 145.00; High:
161.25)
1655.49/11 = 150.50
3 no answer

(Low: 65.00; High:
171.95)
8101.14/67 = 120.91
overall average for
chain stores

(Low: 131.59; High:
201.00)
4491.51/30 = 149.72
overall average for
non-chain stores

(Low: 65.00, High:
171.95)

(Low: 85.00, High
201.00)

(average: 128.17)

High Volume
Counties
(average: 133.40)
Comparison
Counties
(average: 128.11)
Overall Results

Chain Store – Nonchain Store Difference
(P value)
($31.97)
F = 0.1055
T-test (p<0.001)
One-tailed, 2-sample
with equal variance
($22.96)
F = 0.0006
T-test (p<0.001)
One-tailed, 2-sample
with unequal variance
($33.09)
F=0.0723
T-test (p=0.002)
One-tailed, 2-sample
with equal variance
($28.81)
F-test = 0.000442
T-test (p<.001)
One-tailed, 2-sample,
with unequal variance

Across all three categories, chain stores consistently had Narcan® in stock more
frequently than non-chain pharmacies. In High Rate counties, 76.2% of chain store pharmacies
had Narcan® in stock, compared with only 31.6% of non-chain pharmacies (overall average was
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55%). High Volume counties followed a similar pattern, with 76.9% of chain store pharmacies
having Narcan® in stock versus 38.5% of non-chain stores (overall average was 64.1%). In
Comparison counties, 76.9% of chain stores had Narcan® in stock versus 35.7% of non-chain
pharmacies.
Because one pharmacy representative in one High Volume county refused to answer
whether Narcan® was in stock, this response was removed from the database for the purpose of
determining whether chain store status and stock percentage were statistically independent. A
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the idea that there is an association between
chain store and having Narcan® in stock (p< 0.001).
Table 6: Pharmacy answer characteristics stratified by chain store status
Narcan® in
Stock

Chain Store

76.7% (56/73)

Prescription not
required for
purchase of
Narcan®
59.7% (43/72)

No additional requirements
for purchase of Narcan®
(among those requiring
prescription question)
50.0% (20/40)

Non-chain Store

34.7% (16/46)

37.8% (14/37)

38.5% (5/13)

Overall

60.5% (72/119)

52.3% (57/109)

47.2% (25/53)

Because several pharmacy representatives refused to answer whether a prescription was
required to purchase Narcan®, those responses were removed from the database for the purpose
of determining whether county category and correct answers were statistically independent. A
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported idea that chain store status is associated with
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answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for purchasing Narcan® (p=
0.03). The Fisher’s exact test provides the same conclusion with a p-value of 0.0426. Therefore,
the evidence indicates a significant difference among chain store pharmacies and non-chain
pharmacies contacted in answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for
purchasing Narcan®.
Among those who answered that a doctor’s prescription was not required to purchase
Narcan®, more than half either refused to answer or did not know whether additional
requirements existed to purchase Narcan®. These responses were removed from the database
for the purpose of determining whether county category and additional requirements were
statistically independent. A Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the idea that no
significant difference exists between chain stores and non-chain stores from imposing additional
requirements for purchasing Narcan® (n = 53, p= 0.4691, alpha = 0.05). The Fisher’s exact test
provides the same conclusion with a p-value of 0.1963. Therefore, the evidence indicates no
significant difference among chain store pharmacies and non-chain pharmacies contacted in
imposing additional requirements for purchasing Narcan®.

Discussion
Prices for Narcan® did not differ significantly between High Rate counties (average
$128.17; Range: 71.69 to 180.00), High Volume counties (average $133.40; Range: 71.69 to
171.95), or Comparison counties (average $128.11; Range: 65.00 to 201.00). The lack of
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differences in price may mean than the price of Narcan® has no differential effect among county
types. Such prices, however, likely make the purchase of Narcan® out of reach for many
potential purchasers, especially among those who do not have health insurance or who are
unwilling to submit such a pharmacy claim through existing insurance. These prices may also
reflect laws of supply and demand, or shelf space constraints within retail pharmacies, and thus
may respond to policy efforts to subsidize the purchase of Narcan®.
As noted, 55 % of pharmacies in High Rate counties had Narcan® in stock at the time of
contact, compared with 64% of pharmacies in High Volume counties and 62.5% of those in
Comparison counties. One explanation may be higher turnover of inventory because of higher
sales of prices of Narcan® in High Rate counties. Further research may determine whether
naloxone sales in high rate counties differ from other counties in Georgia and whether demand
for Narcan® or other naloxone products outpaces supply.
Despite current legal measures designed to increase availability of Naloxone by removing
the requirement for a prescription, barely more than half the pharmacy representatives
questioned in High Rate counties (51.3%) or High Volume counties (55%) correctly stated that a
physician’s prescription was not required for purchase of naloxone nasal spray, compared with
48.6% of those in Comparison counties. Of pharmacy representatives who correctly stated that a
prescription was not required, most described specific requirements for purchase of naloxone,
such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the potential overdose victim
or the need to see identification such as a driver’s license and the need for a name and address
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from the purchaser. This may reflect a lack of knowledge about the current state of Georgia law,
or it may relate more to pharmacy policies. Pharmacies have certain restrictions and policies
governing drug dispensation, even with a prescription, and pharmacists may even refuse to fill a
prescription on moral grounds. Policies that require a physician’s prescription run counter to the
stated goal of the Standing Order, and the current policy goals of the Georgia General Assembly,
and the United States Surgeon General. Whether or not non-chain pharmacy policies differ from
chain store pharmacy policies surrounding dispensation of Narcan® may be the subject of further
research.
We postulate that a certain amount of stigma surrounds the purchase of Narcan® even if
purchased for a legal and legitimate purpose such as the rescue of a third person. Some people
may not wish to be seen purchasing Naloxone products by friends, co-workers, acquaintances, or
others, because of its close association with drug overdoses, which are in turn often associated
with illegal drug use or drug addiction. Some may not wish to pursue reimbursement for such a
purchase through a health insurance provider, out of fear of rate increases, denial of coverage, or
some other carryover effect.
Discomfort with possessing or purchasing Naloxone may be well-founded. Some
research has indicated that ancillary problems may accompany possessing naloxone, such as
confrontations with police, first responders, shelters, or treatment programs because subjects
possessed naloxone. (Clark, Wilder, & Winstanley, 2014) (Enteen et al., 2010; Galea et al., 2006;
Lankenau et al., 2013) (Doe-Simkins, Walley, Epstein, & Moyer, 2009; Piper et al., 2008;
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Wagner et al., 2010) Some individuals may thus prefer to obtain naloxone discretely, to avoid
embarrassment or revealing the presence of a narcotics addiction to others.
Pharmacy policies exist that will impose restrictions on the purchase of naloxone, such as
requiring a prescription despite the current state of the law or requiring a purchaser to fill out a
form that requests personal information. Anecdotally, a recent news story by CNN reported
about a Walgreens pharmacist who refused to fill a woman’s prescription to induce a miscarriage
on moral grounds.

xv

Barriers to the purchase of naloxone products like Narcan® make it less

likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will seek to obtain
the product. Of note, the six “special counties” that could qualify as either High Rate or High
Volume counties exhibit some differences, but low counts limit further statistical analysis.
Chain store status as confounder
The most surprising results concerned the differences between chain store pharmacies
(with more than 350 stores nationwide) and smaller, non-chain pharmacies. Chain store
pharmacies had significantly lower average prices ($120.91 vs. 149.72; p<0.001) and had higher
stock rates of Narcan® (76.6% vs. 34.7%, p<0.001). Chain store representatives were also
significantly more likely to accurately state that a physician’s prescription was not required to
purchase Narcan® (59.7% vs. 37.8%, p<0.001). Chain store representatives were also
significantly less likely to state that additional measures were required for the purchase of
Narcan®, such as providing photo identification or verifying the existence of an opioidcontaining prescription (50.0% vs. 38.5%, p<0.001). Whether or not these differences reflect
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more accurate knowledge of the law or differences in store policies may be a subject for further
research.
Limitations
This work has two notable strengths: the sample size of 120 of pharmacies across
Georgia represents approximately 6.8% of the total number of pharmacies in the eligible
counties, and is a higher percentage of pharmacies than a similar sample of pharmacies in
Canada conducted by Cressman (Cressman et al., 2017). Further, 100% of pharmacy
representatives contacted provided responses.
A number of factors exist that may limit the applicability of this study. Pricing does not
account for insurance payment, although some may prefer not to file a claim for insurance
reimbursement for reasons mentioned elsewhere. Data used for dividing counties by category
were drawn from CDC data, which was limited to 2008-2014, while different rates may exist
today. As mentioned elsewhere, Georgia has 159 counties, yet only 76 counties had data
available for this research. Counties with unreported or suppressed data may be different from
those counties with reported data. Naloxone may be available through other routes, such as harm
reduction sites not considered by this research. We also assumed that county seats are
representative of whole county, which may or may not be entirely accurate. Pharmacies may
also serve residents from “high volume” locations like Macon or “high rate” locations and also
residents from nearby “comparison” counties, which may skew the results. Some individuals
may prefer to drive out of state to purchase Narcan®, and therefore use a pharmacy not eligible
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for this study. Recorded responses were limited to knowledge and honesty of individual
respondents and may vary from other pharmacy representatives at the same location. Future
research may include interventions to better inform pharmacists of current law, reduce prices,
increase the available supply of Narcan® and address the stigma that co-exists with the purchase
of Narcan®. Pharmacy representatives should be trained to provide professional, accurate
responses concerning this important naloxone product.

Conclusion

In Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of Narcan® exist, making it less likely that
those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will obtain the product.
Pricing and availability constraints may prevent or restrain individuals from purchasing
naloxone. Further, onerous dispensing requirements may also dissuade individuals from
purchasing naloxone. The more barriers that exist, the less likely individuals will obtain
naloxone products to store for emergency use. To the extent that higher prices, lower
availability, and pharmacy policies make layperson purchase of naloxone more difficult, fewer
will make such a purchase.
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Appendix - Chapter 4 – Practical Barriers to Obtaining Naloxone in Georgia

Table 1 - Georgia - percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths
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Figure 1 – All Georgia Counties with Data Available
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Figure 2 – Georgia Counties with Relevant Drug Poisoning Rates
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Figure 3 – Comparison of Study Selected Counties and Counties with any Opioid-Involved
Overdose Emergency Department Visit and Hospitalization

Table 2 – County Categories for Inclusion in Study
Category
Georgia
Population
Deaths
County

High death rate
counties
(>14.45/100,000
poisoning deaths
for 2008-2014)

Ageadjusted
Rate per
100,000;
unsmoothed

County Seat

TOWNS

74214

23

36.96523

Hiawassee

FANNIN

165230

48

36.95304

Blue Ridge

MURRAY

276915

82

29.79573

Chatsworth

FRANKLIN

154678

42

29.58093

Carnesville

36 Counties,
148

588 pharmacies

JEFF DAVIS

104584

30

29.34592

Hazelhurst

HARALSON

200225

60

29.03319

Buchanan

RABUN

114006

28

26.03969

Clayton

STEPHENS

180799

41

23.74747

Toccoa

WHITE

191450

39

22.78253

Cleveland

CARROLL*

779858

169

22.44246

Carrollton

MADISON

196504

44

22.35197

Danielsville

WAYNE

210890

45

21.82538

Jesup

WARE

251572

54

21.36512

Waycross

CATOOSA

451843

93

21.0085

Ringgold

BRANTLEY

127985

24

20.27053

Nahunta

WALKER

478808

90

20.05965

La Fayette

BUTTS

164737

35

19.82342

Jackson

JACKSON

423821

84

19.62884

Jefferson

DAWSON

156804

30

19.61228

Dawsonville

POLK

288988

55

19.23711

Cedartown

PICKENS

206794

38

18.9254

ELBERT

139346

26

18.48645

Elberton

CHATTOOGA

179495

35

18.36627

Summerville

BARTOW*

702123

125

17.98511

Cartersville

PAULDING*

1005214

183

17.74205

Dallas

PIERCE

131029

22

17.66843

Blackshear

GORDON

387823

65

16.96612

Calhoun

GILMER

198578

30

16.84572

Elijay

BARROW

489959

82

16.77498

Winder

149

Jasper

LUMPKIN

212104

34

16.53837

Dahlonega

WHITFIELD*

717046

112

16.29824

Dalton

SPALDING

447505

73

16.26202

Griffin

UPSON

188170

29

16.00388

Thomaston

COFFEE

298255

46

15.51988

Douglas

FLOYD*

672958

104

15.41455

Rome

HART

177300

27

15.30929

Hartwell

PEACH

191305

25

15.23904

Fort Valley

GLYNN

561469

81

15.22088

Brunswick

WALTON

592633

91

15.1097

Monroe

1402666

203

14.9688

Augusta

TROUP

474047

68

14.50411

LaGrange

PUTNAM

148396

22

14.49303

Eatonton

RICHMOND*

150

High death
volume
counties (>100
deaths for 20082014)

20 counties/843
pharmacies

CARROLL*
BARTOW*
PAULDING*
WHITFIELD*
FLOYD*
RICHMOND*
HALL
HENRY
CHEROKEE
FULTON
FORSYTH
MUSCOGEE
COBB
DOUGLAS
COWETA
CHATHAM
BIBB
CLAYTON
GWINNETT
DE KALB

Comparison counties: 20
remaining counties that did not
meet either high death rate or high
death volume category that
reported number of deaths
335 pharmacies
83 remaining counties that did not
meet either high death rate or high
death volume category that did
not report number of deaths
Total population of Georgia

779858
702123
1005214
717046
672958
1402666
1282022
1438340
1529387
6624135
1283674
1363596
4907583
935745
904250
1893038
1085639
1842871
5784398
4911550

169
125
183
112
104
203
179
201
201
877
154
160
629
112
105
210
109
163
427
361

10023647

993

8309644

Did not
report

23357499

All data downloaded from cdc.com WISQARS 6/28/18.
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22.44246
17.98511
17.74205
16.29824
15.41455
14.9688
14.38339
13.76811
13.34801
12.6505
12.45085
12.31633
12.24573
11.92685
11.79587
11.03353
10.50239
9.085256
7.315252
6.935566

10.94
Unweighted
average

Carrollton
Cartersville
Dallas
Dalton
Rome
Augusta
Gainesville
McDonough
Canton
Atlanta
Cumming
Columbus
Marietta
Douglasville
Newnan
Savannah
Macon
Jonesboro
Lawrenceville
Decatur

Age-adjusted Death Rates per 100,000 Population; Standard Year = 2000.
Poisoning, All Intents, All Races, All Ethnicities, Both Sexes, All Ages
Annualized Age-adjusted Rate for Georgia: 11.82
Reports include unknown ages.

Table 3 - Georgia – Percent of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths 2010 - 2017
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CHAPTER 5 – DISSERTATION SUMMARY and FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
RESEARCH

Most policy efforts to address overdose deaths have focused on either supply side
measures or demand side measures. Supply side measures include law enforcement pressure on
drug distribution, possession, and use, Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP),
regulating pharmaceutical manufacturers/distributors of drugs which could then be diverted to
illegal or non-prescribed uses, monitoring medical professionals/doctors/dentists/pharmacists for
overprescribing or over-dispensing, and providing education programs in schools and elsewhere.
However, supply-side measures often shift demand from certain drugs to other drugs less
affected by such measures.
Demand side measures include education policies in schools, public health messages,
treatment for chemical dependency, and the use of probation/parole to mandate chemical
dependency evaluations and treatment. The lag between such efforts and any reduction in
demand of drugs can be difficult to measure.
In contrast to strictly supply-side or demand-side drug policies, this dissertation focuses
on the point of overdose and what happens immediately thereafter. Policies that address the
point of overdose include education concerning recognizing overdose, learning to treat overdose,
and learning the importance of seeking professional help. Other measures include distributing
naloxone to first responders, police, and other officials likely to be present and available to treat
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an overdose victim. Still other measures include providing naloxone to laypersons, which
necessitates appropriate training and assurances of protection from civil or criminal liability.
Typical responses to overdose by non-professionals are depicted below, and can be
charted on a continuum that involves seeking no professional assistance (from first responders,
an emergency department, police, doctors, etc.) to fully seeking professional assistance.
Increasing contact between persons suspected of overdose and medical professionals will more
likely save lives. To the extent that the public, including drug users, are encouraged to seek
professional assistance during suspected overdose events, overdose victims stand a better chance
at surviving the event and ultimately receiving long-term help for drug or alcohol abuse issues.
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What often occurs, however, is individuals will fail to immediately seek professional
assistance during an overdose event. Bystanders and/or the overdose victim may attempt first
aid measures, such as slapping the victim, splashing water, or trying to revive the overdose
victim in other ways. Bystanders may call a friend to ask for assistance or advice. More
recently, naloxone may be available for use with an overdose victim. Even if effective, the
overdose victim should still see a medical professional, as the effect of naloxone wears off.
Some bystanders undertake half-measures when dealing with an overdose, such as
telephoning 9-1-1 to report a possible drug overdose but then leaving the overdose victim in a
public location. This is problematic, because the victim may not be readily located by first
responders. Further, first responders may not be informed about what potential intoxicants the
victim received. More responsible bystanders will communicate quickly and fully with
authorities, and provide information concerning the location, status, and possible substances
consumed.
The crux of the issue is how to appropriately encourage bystanders to overdose to behave
responsibly and quickly. Many distrust police involvement, and hesitate to contact authorities
because they fear police. Some research disputes this notion, but other research highlights
concerns about contacting authorities, harassment from first responders. Moreover, drug induced
homicide statutes in some states, reports of felony murder prosecutions, DFACS investigations,
contacting probation officers, and other measures intensify the fears of some people. Statutes
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that provide immunity from criminal action can have an important impact on the likelihood of
seeking treatment.
Medical amnesty laws are designed to alleviate these fears and are therefore critical to
the success of any program designed to save lives by preventing overdose deaths. For this
reason, this dissertation focuses on those measures most likely to immediately save lives during
overdose. Importantly, this work does not focus on only one class of substance, such as opioids.
Rather, the work is meaningful for any substance. During our nation’s history, we have
experienced overdose epidemics on different classes of drugs and, as noted above, as supply-side
measures exert pressure on a given class of drugs, users will often switch to another class. An
example concerns the recent opioid overdose epidemic, which began as a prescription drug
epidemic. Law enforcement attention and PDMP’s and other measures have exerted pressure on
the diversion of prescription drugs, leading to the more widespread use of heroin. Pressure on
heroin has caused some drug users to more recently switch to methamphetamine. Much of the
work presented in this dissertation applies directly to an overdose involving any substance.
The three studies outlined in this dissertation address different, but interconnected, facets
of combating drug poisoning deaths. The first study surveys medical amnesty laws nationwide
in an effort to provide baseline data on existing statutory provisions. The second study measures
the efficacy of MALs by analyzing the four states with the longest history of MALs:
Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, and Washington. The third study examines barriers that
may make purchasing Narcan® more difficult in Georgia. An examination of price, availability,
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and pharmacy policies that may discourage the discrete purchase of Narcan® may illustrate
barriers not addressed by legislation.
Determining how to appropriately encourage bystanders to overdose to behave
responsibly and quickly is critical. Many distrust police involvement, and hesitate to contact
authorities because they fear police. Statutes that provide immunity from criminal action can
have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking treatment.
Medical amnesty laws are designed to alleviate these fears and are therefore critical to
the success of any program designed to save lives by preventing overdose deaths. For this
reason, this dissertation focuses on those measures most likely to immediately save lives during
overdose. Importantly, this work does not focus on only one class of substance, such as opioids.
Rather, the work is meaningful for any substance. During our nation’s history, we have
experienced overdose epidemics on different classes of drugs and, as noted above, as supply-side
measures exert pressure on a given class of drugs, users will often switch to another class of
drugs.
Except for the pharmacy study, presented as the second paper in this series, this
dissertation work applies directly to overdoses involving any type of substance. The pharmacy
study fits within the dissertation work because of the currently increasing importance of opioid
overdose deaths in Georgia. From 2010 to 2017, drug poisoning deaths from any drug increased
in Georgia by approximately 52%. During the same period, the percentage of opioid-related
overdose deaths increased from approximately 40% to nearly 65%. See Appendix, Figure 8.
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Failing to address the increasing importance of the opioid class of drugs in drug poisoning deaths
would omit an important piece in the overall picture.
The first paper focuses on identifying existing features of MALs and advocating for those
statutory provisions most likely to be effective at encouraging bystanders and overdose victims
to contact authorities during overdose events. This work is critical to understanding how best to
affect policy so that policymakers can be equipped with the tools necessary to write the most
effective legislation possible.
The second paper seeks to determine whether medical amnesty laws are, in fact, working.
While impossible to know precisely to what extent they may be working, legislators and policy
makers should be made aware that the battle to inform the public is not over. Perhaps
Washington’s success may be attributed to educational campaigns in that state to disseminate
information about medical amnesty laws. Future studies may examine public education efforts
in different states to determine which efforts inform the public best.
The third paper suggests that barriers to the purchase of Narcan®, a popularly used form
of naloxone, still exist in Georgia despite legal measures to make purchasing naloxone products
easier for laypersons. Barriers that exist are less likely to be found in chain store pharmacies
(those with more than 350 stores nationwide) that in smaller pharmacies. Barriers do exist:
prices are high, stock rates of Narcan® are intermittent, and pharmacy representatives routinely
describe requirements to purchasing Narcan® that are no longer required by law.
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Fully addressing the current drug overdose crisis in the United States will not be
accomplished with a single approach. Rather, policy makers should consider a range of multidisciplinary approaches designed to educate and equip citizens and professionals everywhere
with the knowledge of what to do during an overdose event. Acting swiftly and decisively
during such an emergency will save lives, and that is the focus of this dissertation.
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Chapter 3 - Endnotes
i

In 2010, Georgia overall drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,062 out of a population of 9,687,653
(10.96 per 100,000), while in 2017, drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,619 out of a population of
10,429,379 (15.52 per 100,000). Thus, overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while
Georgia’s population increased 7.6% from 2010 to 2017 (rate increase is 41.6%). Georgia
Department of Public Health; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ga/POP010210,
accessed 12/13/18; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga, accessed 12/13/18.
ii
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention WISQARS system ***
iii
In 2010, Georgia overall drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,062 out of a population of 9,687,653
(10.96 per 100,000), while in 2017, drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,619 out of a population of
10,429,379 (15.52 per 100,000). Thus, overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while
Georgia’s population increased 7.6% from 2010 to 2017 (rate increase is 41.6%). Georgia
Department of Public Health; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ga/POP010210,
accessed 12/13/18; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga, accessed 12/13/18.
iv
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention WISQARS system
v
Surgeon general advocates for the acquisition and storage of naloxone for easy use.
•

https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/priorities/opioid-overdose-prevention/naloxoneadvisory.html

vi

Georgia Department of Public Health Website:
“How to Administer Naloxone” – page 10
“Love an Addict? Carry Narcan”Source:
https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/Administer%20Naloxone.pdf downloaded
10/13/18.
vii

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-71, a "Dangerous drug" is defined as: (a) A "dangerous drug" means
any drug other than a drug contained in any schedule of Article 2 of this chapter, which, under
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1040 (1938)), 21 U.S.C. Section 301, et seq.,
as amended, may be dispensed only upon prescription.
HB 249: SECTION 1-4 was signed by Governor May 4, 2017, and became effective on July 1,
2017. H.B. 249 amended O.C.G.A. § 16-13-71 (c), relating to the definition of a dangerous
drug, to read as follows:
•

"(14.25) Naloxone ̶ shall also be exempt from subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section
when used for drug overdose prevention and when supplied by a dispenser as follows:
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(A) Nasal adaptor rescue kits containing a minimum of two prefilled 2 ml. luer-lock syringes
with each containing 1 mg./ml. of naloxone;
(B) Prepackaged nasal spray rescue kits containing single-use spray devices with each containing
a minimum of 4 mg./0.1 ml. of naloxone;
(C) Muscle rescue kits containing a 10 ml. multidose fliptop vial or two 1 ml. vials with a
strength of 0.4 mg./ml. of naloxone; or
(D) Prepackaged kits of two muscle auto-injectors with each containing a minimum of 0.4
mg./ml. of naloxone;"
viii

Narcan® is distributed by Adapt Pharma, Inc., Radner, PA., 19087, USA nationwide.
people prefer non-injectable over injectable forms of naloxone
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2018.03.011
ix

x

: https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/Administer%20Naloxone.pdf downloaded
10/13/18.
xi
Priced at $3,732 (at Winn Dixie, Costco, Fred’s Pharmacy) to $4,043 (at Kmart) according to
GoodRx.com, accessed on 10/14/18.

xiii

Georgia had 1,394 drug poisoning deaths from a population of 10,310,371 (age-adjusted rate
with 2000 as standard year of 13.28 per 100,000) for all races, both sexes, and all ages (ICD-10
Codes: X40-44. X60-64, X85, Y10-Y14). This compares with 63,632 such deaths nationwide
that same year, from a United States population of 323,127,513, for an age-adjusted rate of 19.73
per 100,000). CDC, WISQARS.
xiv
Using the 2013 Urbanization (collapsed) Classification (standard population is 2000, all
races, both sexes), Georgia metro areas suffered 1,178 drug poisoning deaths from a population
of 8,532,248 (age-adjusted rate of 13.48 per 100,000) and non-metro areas suffered 216 deaths
from a population of 1,778,123, for an age-adjusted rate of 12.32 per 100,000.
xv

Walgreens pharmacist refuses to fill woman’s prescription to induce a miscarriage. CNN.
June 25, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/health/arizona-prescription-walgreensmiscarriage/index.html
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